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ABSTRACT
Russell, Eugene Robert. Ph.D., Purdue University, August 1974.
Analysis of Driver Reaction to Warning Devices at a High-Accident
Rural Grade Crossing . Major Professor: Harold L. Michael.
The objectives of this research were to analyze the effect on
motorists of improving the warning devices at the Goldsmith grade cross-
ing, a high-accident, rural grade crossing, from 8-inch flashers to
automatic gates and 12-inch flashers activated by a Marquardt speed
predictor and having additional strobe lights; to evaluate suitable
parameters to make the analysis; to study accident history and site
conditions and relate these to motorist reaction to the system - before
and after; and to evaluate the data collection system itself.
Spot speeds were taken at eight points on each approach to obtain
an approach speed profile for various groups under various conditions
after the signal system was improved. These were compared to similar
data taken before system improvement. Similar raw data were available
from FHWA and were analyzed to supplement results
It was shown that an activated gate arm can be as effective in
slowing the average approaching vehicle as a train across the road.
Visibility of gate arms before activation appeared to make the motorist
more aware of the crossing even without signals activated. Train and
signal conspicuity were a problem and contributed to the poor accident
record of older drivers. The strobe lights made the warning system
more visible after activation.
Most drivers approach a grade crossing safely and mean speed of
various groups shows trends but is a relatively weak parameter to test
effectiveness, because they do not isolate the occasional, unsafe driver.
Deceleration rates were not high before or after but this fact is
attributed to the need for long-term studies to "catch" the late-braking
driver. Percent reduction of fastest cars, along with examining
XIV
individual "fastest" cars, showed reductions of all cars 75 mph and
cars on the southbound approach 65 mph and is a better parameter than
mean speeds and decelerations to show improved effectiveness.
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Statement of the Problem
Highway-railway grade crossings constitute a hazard to both the
highway traveler and railroad equipment and personnel and in recent
years, there has been much written concerning the magnitude of the
problem. It is not uncommon to find different accident figures quoted
in different publications, and many times there is confusion regarding
what they really mean.
One reason for the confusion in statistics on accidents at rail-
highway grade crossings relates to the fact that there is need for
better reporting and coordination of all transportation related acci-
dents. Reporting has too often been superficial and fragmented among
uncoordinated agencies.
A 1971 report to Congress summarizes the magnitude of the problem
and categorized rail-highway accidents (l). 1 The more severe train-
vehicle accidents at public grade crossings are reported to the Federal
Railroad Administration. In accordance with their regulations, these
only include those accidents which result either in: 1) a fatality,
2) injury to a person sufficient to incapacitate for a period of 24 hours
in the aggregate during the 10 days immediately following or, 3) more
than $750 damage to railroad equipment, track or roadbed. These
"reportable" accidents at public grade crossings total about 4000 per
year.
All train-involved grade crossing accidents as reported to state
governments by police or drivers total about 12,000 per year. Roughly
1500 fatalities and 7000 injuries annually result from these accidents.
Discrepancies and/or confusion in the literature result when authors
Numbers in parentheses refer to the Bibliography,
report the "4000" figure as the total of all train-vehicle accidents
instead of the true "12000" as the total of all train-involved accidents
which occur at the grade crossing.
In addition, there are an estimated 28,000 accidents which occur in
the vicinity of, and are directly related to the presence of, a grade
crossing but do not involve impact with or by a train (2). These are
less severe but do result in an estimated 280 fatalities per year (l).
It has only been in recent years that a reasonably accurate inven-
tory of the total number of grade crossings has been available. There
are approximately 232,000 grade crossings in the United States, an
average of one per mile of railroad, of which 155,000 are in rural
areas and 77,000 are in urban areas (1). In addition, there are about
140,000 private road grade crossings (1).
Of the 232,000 public grade crossings, 22 percent, or 48,500, have
some type of train-activated protective devices (2). Of the 12,000
vehicle-train collisions occurring at public grade crossings, over 40
percent of these accidents occur at crossings which have some form of
active protection (2). Although other factors such as train and motor
vehicle volumes are involved, it would appear that present active
protective devices are less effective than is desirable.
Accident statistics show that since 1920, 86,000 persons have been
killed, mostly in vehicle-train collisions (1). In the last decade
alone, over 15,000 people have been killed (3). Even though accidents
at rail-highway grade crossings amount to less than .1% of all highway
accidents, they result in 2.7% of the total fatalities; and have a
fatality/injury ratio of 1/2.7. This ratio, compared to 1/35 for general
highway accidents, is an indication of the severity of grade crossing
accidents, second only to airplane crashes.
The grade crossing problem is even more serious in Indiana. In the
period 1965 to 1968, railroad grade crossings in Indiana accounted for
0.4 percent (0.1 for U. S.) of the total accidents and 6.0 percent
(2.5 for U. S.) of the total fatalities (4). Indiana consistently has
had a large number of railroad crossing accidents, primarily because of
its large number of grade crossings.
It is especially important to look at rural grade crossing acci-
dents as the higher operating speeds at such crossings are reflected
in accident severity. During the period 1966 to 1968, rural Indiana
railroad crossing accidents averaged 31 percent of the total grade
crossing accidents; however, fatalities averaged 56 percent of the total
fatalities (5). Thus it would seem that rural grade crossing accidents,
at least in Indiana, are more severe than urban grade crossing accidents
It should also be noted that although all grade crossings average
only one traffic accident es/ery 22 years, some grade crossings have a
number of accidents e\/ery year. For example, one crossing on U. S. 52
in Indiana had at least one fatality and four total accidents each of
the three years (1969 to 1971) (5). These accidents occur despite
automatic protection in the form of flashing lights. It is evident
that present protection systems, short of complete grade separation,
are at best only partially successful.
In the past, whenever there has been an intensive effort to reduce
the grade crossing accident rate, the effort was successful. Thus,
there is reason to believe that a properly directed improvement program
would achieve positive results. In the Report to Congress, it was
estimated that at least 3000 improved protection installations should
be made annually for the next 10 years at an expenditure of $75 million/
year (three times the current rate) and that this expenditure of
resources would eliminate nearly 4000 vehicle-train collisions and
save 500 lives annually (2).
A Department of Transportation study showed that for a 48-year
period from 1920 through 1967, whenever a new grade crossing protection
improvement program was initiated, casualty reduction was noticeable.
This study used the statistic "casualty ratio" as a measure of meaning-
ful comparison, so that comparisons take into account increases in both
vehicular and train traffic that have occurred over the years. As
defined below:
Casualty Ratio = Number of Casualties (Each Year)
Exposure Factor (Corresponding Year)
Where,
Train Miles x Motor Vehicle MilesExposure Factor =
10
18
In terms of casualty ratio, the study drew two significant conclusions
(1, 6, 7):
1. Grade separation and grade crossing protection
programs have resulted in a marked decrease in
highway- rail road grade crossing casualties. If
the casualty ratio in 1967 had been the same as
it was in 1920, the grade crossing casualties in
accidents involving motor vehicles in 1967 would
have been about 55,000 instead of 5,246, and:
2. Since 1958, the trend of grade crossing casualties
has been upward and the casualty ratio has not
been improved, thus indicating that more effort is
now necessary to bring about a reduction in casual-
ties in the face of a rapidly increasing motor
vehicle traffic.
It is difficult to determine exactly in what direction the effort
should be directed, particularly with limited funds available, but there
are indications that new forms of driver information systems are needed
at railroad grade crossings.
The federal aid highway act of 1973 set aside a total of $175
million dollars over a three-year period for grade crossing projects
on the federal -aid system. At least half of this is specified for
protective devices. Additional funding for projects off the federal
-
aid system was not specifically funded; however, grade crossing safety
projects in this category may be a part of a state's safety improvement
program. Many people feel that the amount is insufficient. Neverthe-
less, the amounts available should be spent wisely. In order to do this,
more must be known about the problems at highway-railroad grade crossings.
This means that more research needs to be conducted and that this research
must be done as economically and effectively as possible.
Very little is known regarding the effectiveness of existing,
as well as proposed, innovative grade crossing protective devices.
Sonnefield, at a recent (1972) grade crossing safety symposium workshop,
pointed out the inadequacy of police and railroad accident reports for
obtaining meaningful statistics on accident causation and contributing
factors (8):
My only objective in indicating these things is the
need to show more detailed information so that we
can attempt to reconstruct accidents, if not on a
wholesale basis at least on a selective basis, and
attempt to get at the cause and establish some
meaningful predictive procedures.
Thus, it is usually very difficult to determine the inadequacy of a
particular protection system from individual accident reports.
The only true measure of the effectiveness of any grade crossing
protection system is a long-term reduction in accidents. Accident
reduction must be measured over a long period for a single crossing or
aggregated over a great number of crossings for a given type of protec-
tion. At a single crossing the accident experience immediately follow-
ing any protection change not only is not a good indication, but may be
misleading. This is true because, unfortunately, most protective
devices are placed at crossings because of some crises involving an
unusual number of accidents for some given period. In the following
period there probably will be a reduction even if nothing had been done.
This is simply a basic law of statistics. It is possible, therefore,
for some added protection to be given credit for accident reduction
over a short period of time where no credit is due.
In addition to lack of knowledge on driver reactions to various
grade crossings situations, and particularly their reactions to the
whole range of present standard protective devices, there is evidence
that new protective devices are needed in some instances. Many non-
standard protection devices are being installed or proposed. However,
relatively few of these innovations are field tested or evaluated for
driver reaction and compliance. The problem of testing new devices is
a very complex one. As expressed by Hopkins and Hazel (9)
...thus, beyond the question of reliability, any
system which presents a significantly changed aspect
to the motorist possesses a real challenge in the
evaluation of its effectiveness, not only in devising
and interpreting tests, but also in implementing them
in actual service.
The focus in the past concerning railroad grade crossing problems
has been primarily on hazard index formulas and accident prediction
equations. The purpose of these formulas and equations has been to
determine priorities for the improvement of protection at specific grade
crossings. Available protection, however, has not eliminated accidents
at grade crossings.
The Need for Improved Systems
A relatively inexpensive warning system is needed at crossings
with high volumes, high-speed traffic and/or high accident records.
A system is needed that would approach the safety of a separation
structure at a fraction of the cost. A system is needed that will have
a strong, positive impact on the driver. Recent research emphasizes
this last statement.
In a paper summarizing recent grade crossing research for the
American Railway Engineering Association, Michael made the following
observations (10):
1. Advance warning to the motorist at an approaching
railroad crossing and (informing him of) his
responsibility throughout are today generally
inadequate.
2. There is a need for the development of low-cost
protective devices of both the railroad-ahead
warning type and train-approaching warning type.
3. Motorists need to be more impressed with the
importance of the train-vehicle hazard.
In the same paper, Michael discussed the importance of improving
driver information systems at grade crossings:
It is also clear that information needed most by the
motorist concerns itself with emphasis on his responsi-
bilities at a crossing and in seeing an approaching
train in time for him to stop. Anything that can be
done to improve getting that information to him will
improve safety at the crossing.
Mr. William B. Johnson, President of the Illinois Central Railroad,
at a recent national conference on rail-highway grade crossing safety
remarked (5):
We need uniform, better signs in advance of and at
crossings. It seems to me that present signs were
designed for auto speeds much lower than the autos
presently in use. Crossing signs sized and spaced
for the Model "T" era preceding the modern automobile
era are obviously obsolete and should be retired.
If every driver could be taught to have the proper respect for
present highway-railroad grade crossing protection devices and could
be conditioned to proceed cautiously, there would obviously be a great
reduction in vehicle-train collisions at highway -rail way grade cross-
ings. In particular, if ewery driver was conditioned to react to
present railroad advance warning signs, i.e., to become mentally alert
and physically prepared to stop when necessary, grade crossing accidents
could possibly be greatly reduced. Human nature, however, is such that
the prospect of educating and conditioning all drivers to react in such
a manner is pure idealism.
Studies and accident case histories show many drivers develop
unsafe attitudes toward grade crossing protection devices of all types,
even activated, automatic devices and particularly toward passive pro-
tection devices. When a motorist crosses the average railroad track
at some random moment of a day, statistically there is a very small
probability that it will be occupied by a train. He may use a crossing
(or several crossings) for days, months, or even years without ever
meeting a train at a grade crossing, and become so conditioned to the
ever present railroad advance warning signs and no trains that the
signs become meaningless.
A study of the obedience to stop signs, placed at grade crossings
in Lincoln, Nebraska, sheds light on driver attitudes at grade crossings
(11). The study found a willful disregard of stop signs placed at
railroad grade crossings which was far higher compared to their dis-
regard at street intersections. Even the stop sign, to which obedience
is sacrosanct to most drivers, is ignored by some drivers when placed
at a railroad grade crossing.
Conditions differ at individual crossings, but nationwide driver
disregard for warning devices at highway-railway grade crossings is all
too common. These situations at railroad grade crossings emphasize an
outstanding example of human nature, i.e., when people are alerted
unnecessarily they begin to disregard the warning. Yet drivers are
expected, theoretically at least, to become immediately alert and
responsive to every passive, railroad advance-warning sign. Accident
records prove that it doesn't always work, even under ideal conditions.
At a recent grade crossing safety conference, Conner mentioned this
aspect of the problem (12):
The driver's attitude toward train conflicts varies
considerably. As trains are very seldom encountered
by him in his normal driving tasks he becomes
unconcerned with the possibility that he may encounter
a situation that is dangerous to him. Then when the
dangerous situation is presented to him he is both
awed, and frightened by it. In this condition he is
not likely to act in a predictable or rational
manner.
In regard to improvement of devices, the Voorhees Report (13) states
that the greatest immediate opportunity for improvement for a motorist's
decision-making process is in the area of improving passive protection
at railroad grade crossings. There will always be a need for a family
of passive devices tailored to meet a range of situations where active
devices are not economically feasible.
The above study proposed different sets of advance warning sign
sequences to better inform the motorist of his obligations at the
crossing. For example, there are two main categories of obligations
(13):
1. . Where the motorist would have to watch for a
signal which would indicate the approach of a
train, i.e., automatic signal protection at
the tracks.
2. Where the motorist must determine for himself
if a train is approaching, i.e., passive
protection such as crossbucks.
The point stressed herein is that the study found the present advance
warning sign in need of improvement, even at minor crossings where
automatic devices are not warranted.
Although passive advance warning signs, in their present form or
with new innovations, will be needed at most grade crossings as the
Voorhees report recommends, a different type of warning is needed at
grade-crossings on high-speed heavily traveled routes. Advance warning
with a much greater impact is needed. High accident records at many
crossings, particularly on high-speed highways emphasize the fact that
current automatic signals and passive advance warning signs are inade-
quate.
In regard to communications at railroad grade crossings, Conner
(12) points out a need for the driver being told what he is expected to
do and the problem of how to communicate this to him. Modern vehicles
include radios, air conditioners, heaters, and excellent insulation
which tend to isolate the driver from outside sounds and detract his
attention from conditions at grade crossings. There may need to be
more reliance on improved visual devices.
New and faster trains will add to the problem. Even with adequate
sight distances the ability of drivers to estimate the closing speed of
high speed trains and make a reliable "stop or go" decision may be poor.
Williamson concluded that more estensive use of sophisticated electronic
hardware to detect the speeds of trains and give uniform warning times,
such as that being used by some railroads is needed (14). At present,
these systems should be considered for use at all crossings.
In a recent report by Richards of the Texas Transportation Institute
on rail-highway grade crossing safety improvement programs, one conclu-
sion drawn from the analysis of rail-highway accidents occurring on the
Texas highways is that (15): "The type of protection installed at rail-
highway intersections may not be as effective in the reduction of acci-
dents as often assumed."
Statistics from the above report showed that 10.4 percent of the
total accidents were attributed to "braking late" and 48 percent to
"ignored signal" (15). These statistics indicate that in over half
(58.5 percent) of these accidents, the information system did not have
the desired impact on the driver, because if it had, he would not have
braked late, nor would he have ignored the signal.
There are situations where the present, standard, automatic signal
protection at railroad grade crossings is apparently doing its job
because not all crossings have bad accident records. On the other
hand, there are too many situations where the present standard, automatic
signal protection, is obviously not sufficient because these crossings
do have bad accident records. There are probably crossings where the
grades would be separated if money were readily available for this
purpose, but since it is not, the latest technology and innovations in
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driver information systems might be useful in providing the additional
protection needed.
There is also another facet of the accident problem at railroad
grade crossings that needs attention. Currently there are about 40,000
accidents in the vicinity of railroad grade crossings. About half of
those not involving a train are rear-end collisions involving two or
more vehicles (16). An effort should be made to incorporate into
advance warning systems the capacity to alert drivers to conditions
ahead which result in this type of accident. Such conditions include
vehicles that must make a mandatory stop at railroad grade crossings
and present a hazard of their own, independent of train movements.
The Voorhees Report (13) estimated that mandatory stops were
responsible for 13.3% of the accidents at railroad grade crossings.
The technology to warn of this type of hazard is currently available,
and it should be developed to determine its potential for accident
reduction.
The Need for More Research
There is need for more research to obtain performance data on
innovations that would be effective alternatives. As stated by James
Wilson (17), Chairman of the National Joint Committee on Uniform
Traffic Control Devices 1967-1970,
...Compared to research in other highway related
fields the amount for traffic control devices is
minimal. It's about time industry and government
meet the demands of these times to alleviate
motor vehicle crashes and inefficient operations
of our streets and roads... More information on
new and innovative traffic control devices must
be available to decision makers...
Wilson was not talking specifically about devices at grade crossings,
but it certainly applies. Contrary to what many may believe because of
the great volume of recent reports on grade crossing safety, the problem
is not well understood and has not yet been well researched. This situa-
tion is discussed by Eicher who noted that although there were many
notable studies on grade crossing safety the problems were not well
understood (18):
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The symptoms of the problem or the number of
collisions involving certain types of vehicles
at certain types of grade crossings are reason-
ably well documented, but the problem itself
is not.
In an attempt to formulate and validate a simulation flow model,
Eicher found while searching the literature that ^ery little is known
concerning how the important characteristics of grade crossings interact,
He therefore had to resort to judgment in developing sometimes question-
able and/or vague relationships between the variables, because answers
are needed to the following questions (18):
1. How do drivers respond to an approaching train
when it is within the line of sight of the
driver, and how does this response vary as a
function of the motor vehicle's speed, the train's
speed and the position of the motor vehicle and
train?
2. How do drivers respond to passive as well as
active warning devices and what factors influ-
ence their compliance to a directive to stop
because of an approaching train?
Research of this type is in itself expensive, as are railroad grade
crossing improvements; however, consider the following point of view.
Robinson (19) expressed the feeling that the question (spoken or
unspoken), "How much is society willing to pay for added crossing
safety and, how the funds are going to be collected?" should not perm-
eate rail -highway safety conferences and symposiums as it does. Not
because it is not important, but because it is not properly a question
for engineers and administrators to answer. As expressed by Robinson
(19):
The public's decision will be made by the public's
representatives in board rooms and legislative
halls. Our job as administrators and as profes-
sionals is to assemble the facts and call these to
the attention of the policy groups as the basis
for a sound decision.
The Voorhees report is the most comprehensive and perhaps signifi-
cant of all research studies in highway- rail way grade crossing safety
that has been done to date. Even though this report is a great contribu-
tion to current knowledge of grade crossing safety, it did not attempt
to answer the questions presented above.
12
Insight into the direction that future efforts must take was well
presented by Koltnow; he praised many steps taken by Congress but
cautioned (46):
None of these steps, however, is likely to
make a substantial change in the crossing
accident experience in the next few years,
unless other important steps are also taken.
One of these steps is to insure that railroad
crossing accidents are considered accurately
in relation to other safety needs in each
state and local agency.
A second is to encourage public agencies to
know which crossings are most in need of
improvement and most susceptible to various
treatments.
The third is to develop a better understanding
of all the factors that lead to crossing acci-
dents, and a more complete and effective package
of countermeasures.
These noble objectives cannot be met without a continuing program
of research. The level and type of research program necessary, particu-
larly field testing the effectiveness of both current and proposed
devices to arrive at -- "a more complete and effective package of
countermeasures," cannot be accomplished effectively without resolving
some of the issues which affect good interagency cooperation.
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CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF LITERATURE
General
Much of the literature relating to grade crossings is widely
scattered in little-read or limited-distribution publications such as
State Police accident reports, Interstate Commerce Commission Reports,
bulletins of various railroad associations, studies by area planning
commissions, State and local government highway departments and similar
other relatively obscure sources. Many of these published reports
relate to a specific problem of a specific group. There has been little
actual research, particularly "field research" or an attempt to obtain
basic data.
The literature reviewed herein will be that which has been the most
significant in recent years. This includes material from some signifi-
cant reports of government agencies and transportation institutes,
proceedings of conferences formed to discuss the grade crossing problem,
and recent research.
Predictive Equations
This section presents the state-of-the-art of accident prediction
at a railroad-highway grade crossing. There are merits in the various
approaches reviewed. The obvious complex nature of the "accident
problem," where the driver- vehicle- roadway system interacts with the
protection system, environment and train, leads to short-comings in
predictive models. The problem of finding or developing reliable
parameters that relate directly to accident experience is a formidable
one
Schoppert and Hoyt (1968) point out that (13):
14
The bulk of previous research falls into three
general areas, as follows:
1. Development of hazard indexes
2. Development of predictive equations
3. Analysis of before-and-after accident data
and other miscellaneous studies.
In a later report (1969) Schoppert emphasized that early research
was directed along these lines because of lack of reliable data. He
reviews the argument of critics of the method that (21):
...these indexes are not appropriate for allocating
funds among competing crossings primarily because
the ranking they lead to is not based on economic
considerations, and the resulting ordering is not
cardinal
.
Schoppert reviews the "state-of-the-art" of hazard index locations
(21). Most hazard indexes are of the form:





where: the set of X^s consists of motor vehicle and train volumes and
speeds and the characteristics of the site. The a-'s are weighting
factors. The weights (a^s) are subjectively assigned with frequently
no statistical justification.
The normal procedure in these approaches is to collect data on
whatever characteristics the researcher believes to be significant and
to relate this to accident history by regression or factor analysis
techniques. Some of the resulting equations are relatively simple,
others complex. Some consider a few factors, others a more complete
list. Schultz (22) appears to have included the most complete list and
it is presented here as an example of the types of factors considered
in this type of research. The variables in Table 1 were considered by
Schultz (22).
As expected, Schultz developed rather complex equations. In subse-
quent papers, Schultz and Oppenlander (23) and Berg, Schultz and Oppen-
lander (24) identified the following as important predictive variables:
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TABLE 1. VARIABLES CONSIDERED BY SCHULTZ FOR GRADE CROSSING HAZARD
EVALUATION (Source: Ref. 22)
1. Vehicle type 30.
2. Vehicle age 31.
3. Out-of-Country 32.
4. Out-of-State 33.
5. Number of Occupants 34.
6. Actual car speed 35.
7. Actual train speed 36.
8. Vehicle defects 37.
9. PCC surface 38.
10. Asphalt surface 39.
11. Gravel surface 40.
12. Dry pavement 41.
13. Ice or snow 42.




18. Male driver 47.
19. Driver age 48.






























Average freight train speed
Number of passenger trains





Sum of 44, 45, and 47
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1. No. of track pairs
2. Highway pavement width
3. Train volume
4. Average daily traffic volume
5. Sum of distractions (no. houses, businesses and advertising
signs)
As complex as their equation was (I.H. = -0.185 + 0.079X„ +
0.021X,, + 0.011X
5(t + 0.013X 55 + 0.024X 57 ) it only explained 13 percent
of the accident occurrence leading to the conclusion that, "railroad-
highway grade crossing accidents are predominantly the result of driver
characteristics and/or chance" (23).
It is this latter conclusion that is, possibly, more significant
than the prediction equation itself. Other conclusions of the study
that relate to studies herein are (23, 24):
Accident victims are predominantly young male drivers,
traveling alone. Seventeen percent of all vehicles
have evidence of mechanical defects. Windows were
closed on most vehicles minimizing the importance of
audio warnings. Most accidents occur during the
favorable driving conditions of clear weather, day-
light hours and dry pavements.
There was no positive evidence, however, to indicate that the fact
that some of the involved vehicle had mechanical defects was a contribut-
ing factor to the accidents.
Berg, et al., made another important observation (25) relative to
driver observance of railroad-highway grade crossing protective devices.
In a compliance study comprising 153 observed motorists, it was found
that there was 46 percent compliance at flasher installations and 90
percent compliance at automatic gates. For a comprehensive review of
research in this area the reader is referred to Schoppert (13),
Appendix A, and the 75 references contained therein.
In Chapter 1 of Traffic Control and Roadway Elements - Their
Relationship to Highway Safety
, Richards (26) summarizes the "selected
hazard index formulas." These are presented below in Table 2, primarily
to emphasize the variety of output that one obtains from this type of
research effort.
The set of relative hazard factors for selected protective devices
that is probably most commonly used is from the Voorhees Report (13) and
is presented in Table 3.
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TABLE 2. SELECTED HAZARD INDEX FORMULAS (Ref. 26)










New Hampshire Formula (54) H.I. = VTP,








Wisconsin Method (87) H.I. =
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Utah Formula (89): H.I. =
1000 10 20 30
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City of Detroit Formula (50): H.I. =
















Af = Accident probability factor
Bf = Train speed factor
CBf = Type and speed of train factor
Df = Alignment of track and highway factor
F = Number of freight trains in 24 hours
Gf = Approach gradient factor
H.I. = Hazard index
K = Additional parameter
Lf = Angle of crossing factor
Nf = Number of tracks factor
P = Number of passenger trains in 24 hours
P
1
= Number of pedestrians in 24 hours
Pe = Protection coefficient
Pf = Protection factor
S = Number of switch trains in 24 hours
SDR = sight distance rating
t = Time crossing is blocked
T = Average 24-hour train volume
T
x
= Average daylight train volume
T 2 = Average train volume during dark hours
Tf = Train volume factor
V = Average 24-hour traffic volume
Vj = Average daylight traffic volume
V 2
= Average traffic volume during dark hours
Vf = Traffic volume factor
VTf = Exposure factor
Xf = Condition of crossing factor
Yf = Severity factor
Z = Number of traffic lanes
* The reference numbers in parentheses in the table above refer to the
references at the end of Chapter 1 by Richards (26) and are not
repeated herein because the publication is readily available.
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TABLE 3. RELATIVE HAZARD RELATIONSHIPS FOR PROTECTIVE DEVICES AT
RAILROAD GRADE CROSSINGS (Ref. 26)






Another noteworthy study in this area was done by Bezkorovainy and
Holsinger (27). They conducted a study to determine which of eleven
established accident prediction formulas should be used to rate railroad
crossings in the city of Lincoln, Nebraska. All eleven formulas were
used independently to rate all of Lincoln's 180 grade crossings.
Bezkorovainy and Holsinger concluded that all eleven formulas were "all
equally good or all equally bad."
A second part of the study concluded that the New Hampshire formula
was optimum for local conditions. It is (27):
H.I. = VTP
where H.I. = hazard index
V = average 24-hour traffic volume
T = average 24-hour train volume
P = protection factor, gates = 0.1, flashing lights = 0.6,
signs only = 1.0
The Hazard Index research, however, was not getting to the basic
causes of accidents. Considering 57 initial variables, Schultz's
resultant equation only explained 18 percent of the accident occurrence.
Thus it is apparent that driver characteristics must be considered.
Schoppert makes an excellent point in this regard (13):
Accidents depend on such factors as driver skill and
perception, etc., which would be impossible to quantify
in any consistent way. It is obvious also that many
accidents occur from essentially random causes and so
any predictive equation is bound to "explain" less than
100 percent of accident behavior, even in the very long
run. However, even an equation which made use of only the
criteria which had major effects would be quite useful.
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Theoretical Basis of Quantitative Evaluations
Schoppert extended the hazard index approach and developed statis-
tical models (13, 21). These models appear to be the most sophisticated
of those that appear in the literature. He relies on the Poisson dis-
tribution, since accidents either happen or they do not happen in a
given time period. One has to hypothesize that the distribution of
accident frequencies is completely random with an average equal to the
observed average.
Schoppert, et al., (13) compared expected and observed distributions
of accidents by protection type and made two points, 1) the assumption of
randomness was not necessarily the basic point violated and, 2) predict-
ing the tendency toward accidents was desirable even though the random-
ness assumption does not hold. They developed the following model (13):
P = R(K + p) 1
where:
P = the probability of an accident •
K = the probability of a vehicle arriving at a grade crossing
occupied by a train
p = the probability of a train arriving at the grade crossing
occupied by a vehicle
R = the risk that a driver will be unaware of his surroundings,
hence will not, or cannot, take evasive action to avoid a
pending collision, i.e., R = 1 implies unswerving drivers who
are completely oblivious to all obstacles in their path; and
R = implies perfect information and complete awareness, hence
no risk.
Using the above approach, the following equations were developed (13):
Summary of Equations
Crossbucks :
Highway volume below 500 per day:
x, = x 10 (38.90)
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Highway volume greater than 500 per day:
Urban




= x 10 (30.35)
STOP Signs :
Highway volume below 500 per day:
Xj = x 10 (45.13 + 2.51x 7 + 13.5x 6 )
Highway volume greater than 500 per day:
x
1
= x 10 (11.44)
Flashing Light Signals :
Urban
Xi = x 10 (3.23)
Rural
Xl = x 10 (9.30)
Gates :
Urban
Xj = x 10 (3.23)
Rural
Xi = x 10 (1.93)
in which:
Xi = accidents per year, scaled by 100;
x 2 = ADT;
x 5 = angle of crossing, acute angle; measured in degrees;
x 6 = total number of highway lanes;
x 7 = maximum absoluted approach gradient within 100 feet of
crossing; and









x 3 = trains per day; and
X2 = highway vehicles per day.
In summary , the above equations appear to be the most sophisticated,
theoretical approach that can be found in the recent literature; however,
many assumptions and simplifications were necessary in their development.
They can be useful for ranking grade crossings.
One criticism, found in the literature, of using hazard index
equations for relative rankings and/or priority ratings is that it does
not include economic considerations. Determining appropriate accident
costs is difficult. Putting an appropriate cost on a life is very
difficult. For these reasons, accident costs are often ignored in
highway economic studies, or when used, there is no general agreement
as to their validity. However, it is becoming increasingly clear that
any (and all) highway improvements should be cost-effective. Richards
and Lamkins made attempts to improve these models by including incre-
mental benefits in development of a priority index (15). Many assumptions
have to be made regarding accident and fatality rates and costs as well
as the effectiveness of an increment of protection. However, economic
considerations cannot be ignored.
Equations from Accident Base
Huntington, Coleman, Eicher and Hunter conducted the most recent
study to analyze accident potential for individual crossings using
regression analysis, and for broad groups of crossings using summary
accident statistics (28). The study confirmed previous efforts in that
regression equations developed for individual crossings did not explain
a significant amount of variation in accidents. It was decided to
analyze accident potential for groups
,
using least squares regression
on group means.
The study was conducted using a data base of over 16,000 crossings
of which five years of accident data were available. The data were
grouped into rural and urban locations and by six types of protection,
1) none, 2) stop signs, 3) crossbucks, 4) automatic gates, 5) flashing
light signals and 6) "other active."
Multiple linear regression was used to relate the mean group train
and highway traffic volumes. Even with the large data base, limitations
in the number of points for the attempted regression led to the aggrega-
tion of protection type into active and passive.
The regression equation developed was (28):
Log 10 A = C + C, log 10 V + C 2/T
where:
A = mean number of accidents per crossing for five years in a
group of crossings which carry highway and train traffic
volumes within preselected ranges
Cj = coefficients of the regression
V = mean daily highway traffic volume in the group of crossings
T = mean daily train traffic volume in the group of crossings
The coefficients for the various group equations are given in
Table 4 (28). As stated in the report (28):
The primary use of the equations is to assess the
savings in train involved accidents as a result
of upgrading the crossing protection.
Figure 1 illustrates the four equations showing the expected 5-year
accidents per crossing at various highway volumes for a fixed 10 trains
per day. Figure 2 illustrates the expected 5-year accidents per
crossing at various daily train volumes for a fixed highway volume of
2,500 vehicles per day.
Grade Crossing Safety Factors
There have been several significant, recent reports (1968 to 1972)
that have made substantial contributions to the state of knowledge
regarding grade crossing safety (1, 2, 9, 13, 15, 21). This group of
reports has dealt primarily with review and analysis of accident data
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TABLE 4. BEST-FIT EQUATIONS FOR GROUP-MEAN OBSERVATIONS TO PREDICT
EXPECTED 5-YEAR ACCIDENTS PER CROSSING (Ref. 28, p. 36)
Log 10 A = C + Cj Log 10 V + C 2/T
Area-Protection Regression Coefficients
Co. Cl c^ R N E
Urban-Passive 1.813 0.321 0.164 0.90 20 0.022
Urban-Active 1.915 0.321 0.185 0.89 16 0.034
Rural-Passive 3.031 0.699 0.218 0.94 16 0.021
Rural -Active 2.624 0.487 0.209 0.87 13 0.040
R = multiple correlation coefficient
N = number of groups
E_ = standard error of estimate
A = mean number of accidents per crossing for 5 years
V_ = mean daily highway traffic volume in the group of crossings





























FIGURE Z- Expected Five Year Accidents Per Crossing for V= 2500 (vpd)
(Source- Ref. 28 )
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obtained from a wide variety of sources. For example, the Voorhees
Report (13) obtained data from private sources, state highway depart-
ments, and regulatory agencies, including 15,000 accident reports from
the Interstate Commission.
No attempt will be made herein for a complete review of any of
these readily-available reports. None of these reports deals primarily
with collection and analysis of field data. No attempt was made in any
of them to determine basic data of driver reactions to grade crossings.
Schoppert and Hoyt developed formulae for probable accident rates
for grade crossings. Conclusions of their study are paraphrased below
(13):
Flashing lights and gates reduce materially the numbers
of accidents that occur at railroad crossings.
On a per crossing basis, the incidence of accidents is
very small, on the order of less than one every 10 years,
therefore, a protection program should not be based on
an individual crossings accident experience.
Suggested, implicit cost assumptions for economic
analysis are: cost per accident, $8,000; cost of
flashing lights, $13,000; cost of gates, $26,000;
cost to upgrade flashing light to gates, $13,000;
cost of grade separation, $100,000; and economic
life of improvement, 10 years (1968 costs).
Equations were developed for nontrain-involved
accidents:
With automatic gates;
EA = TM (°- 00866 + 0.00036 T)





EA = number of expected accidents
V = number of vehicles per day
T = number of trains per day
(It should be noted that the "EA" with automatic gates is
higher than for all other types of protection.)
Vehicles that are required to stop at all railroad crossings
account for approximately 13.3 percent of all accidents
which occur when a train is present.
27
Analysis of the accident data indicated that the
major safety problem is caused by trains that appear
to the motorist after the driver has passed his
final opportunity to stop.
For a large number of crossings, improved passive
protection is needed to make the motorists'
responsibility clear.
The majority of grade-crossing accidents occur
during the daylight hours; however, accidents
"normalized" for highway volumes occur more fre-
quently at night.
Richards and Lamkin (15) made a comprehensive study of grade cross-
ing safety in Texas and reported on the statistical and economic aspects
of the problem. From the analysis of rail-highway accidents occurring
on Texas highways during the period 1962-1966, the following conclusions
drawn (15):
1. Tractor-trailer trucks experience a relatively
higher proportion of the rail-highway accidents
than all other classes of motor vehicles.
2. When compared with all other classes of vehicles,
tractor-trailer trucks experience a relatively
higher proportion of rail -highway accidents in
urban areas.
3. Most rail-highway accidents occur during daylight
hours.
4. Approximately thirty percent of the rail-highway
accidents occurring on Texas highways were at the
intersection of farm-to-market roads and railways
within urban areas.
5. The farm-product truck may have a higher frequency
of rail -highway accidents than trucks used in
other services.
6. The type of protection installed at rail-highway
intersections may not be as effective in the
reduction of accidents as often assumed.
7. Drivers over fifty years of age are less aware of
hazards at rail -highway intersections than they
are of all other types of motor vehicle operation
hazards
.
8. The condition of the motor vehicle does not appear
to be an important factor in the cause of train-
vehicle accidents.
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9. It does not appear that the use of intoxicants
is as significant in rail-highway accidents as
generally reported for all motor vehicle accidents.
10. Although failure of the motor vehicle to stop at
rail-highway protective devices displaying flashing
red light appears to contribute to these accidents,
excessive speed on the approach to the crossings is
not reported as a significant contributor to rail-
highway accidents.
The above list is typical, both in type and content, of the type
of conclusions that can be drawn from analysis of accident data. Con-
clusions such as these can pinpoint contributions to the accident
history of aggregated crossings, but not to basic causes, nor to
specific crossings. This is essentially the same drawback that pre-
dictive equations have.
The report further points out another problem with using accident
data. Each year about 800 rail -highway accidents occur in the state of
Texas, however, in accord with FRA reporting requirements as previously
discussed, only one-half of these accidents are reported to the Railroad
Commission in Texas (15).
In response to the Railroad Safety Act of 1970, the Federal Railroad
Administration and Federal Highway Administration, jointly, submitted to
Contress a report identifying the extent and nature of the safety prob-
lem associated with railroad-highway intersections (1, 2). Some relative
points brought out in this study are paraphrased below (1):
The results of an economic analysis to provide an
economic-order-of-magnitude of the problem indicate that if
15,000 crossings were provided with improved protection,
accident costs would be reduced nearly three times the instal-
lation and maintenance cost of the improvement.
Initial cost of installation of protective devices ranges
from approximately $15,000 for installation of flashing lights
to approximately $25,000 for installation of automatic gates.
Train speed measurement devices add to the cost. Annual
maintenance costs range from $750 to $1,250. Grade separations
have an average cost range of $320,000 to $930,000 (1970 costs).
All grade crossing accidents are to some degree "driver
error." Any effective program for safety improvement should be
driver oriented and consider his needs in approaching, travers-
ing and leaving the crossing site as safely and efficiently as
possible. That is, when a driver approaches a crossing he needs
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to know if there is a train, 1) on the crossing, 2) approaching
the crossing, or 3) not in the vicinity of the crossing. Auto-
matic devices which give the driver a uniform advance warning
time prior to arrival of the train significantly simplify the
driver's task and substantially reduce motor vehicle-train
coll is ions.
Currently available active crossing devices are flashers
and gates. These are fail safe devices that are essentially
effective in reducing accidents, but their cost has restricted
their use to crossings with high train and motor vehicle
volumes. Also, there is a need for more reasonably priced
devices to measure train speed. This would permit their wider
use and, 1) give added credibility to the signal's warning,
and 2) reduce delay and operating costs.
Modifications to the train are being evaluated as likely
aids to the driver in detecting the approach of a train.
These include visibility and audibility modifications to the
locomotive such as high intensity zenon lights and more
effective use of paint.
Finally, in the conclusion to the executive summary, it
is stated that (1):
... with the tremendous growth in motor vehicle miles,
serious congestion on urban streets, and increasing
interest in high-speed rail service as an alternative
mode in transportation planning, improved highway and
railway mobility has assumed new importance. Effective
resolution of the grade crossing problem should consider
both increased safety and more efficient use of the
highway and railroad systems.
In the Report to Congress, Part II, alternative levels of improve-
ment needs on a nationwide basis are determined and set forth. This
analysis includes the number and type of improvements, costs, anticipated
reductions in accidents and casualties, and total benefits (2). In
regard to improvement needs the study made the following points:
The economic analysis of protection was limited to
flashing lights, automatic gates and grade separation struc-
tures. The results showed that grade crossing protection will
return both greater overall benefits for a given level of
investment than will grade separations.
Innovative Devices
Butcher conducted a recent (1973) extensive search of the litera-
ture for all available information regarding use of any type of
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innovative grade crossing device (29). These include several innovative
advance warning devices which have been installed in actual service,
somewhere, and are either activated through rail circuitry or are in
continuous operation.
The list of innovative devices that were uncovered and of possible
merit are listed below in self explanatory categories.
Implemented Active Advance Warning Devices
1. Three horizontal yellow flashers (Los Angeles, California).
2. Neon "R X R GATE" Sign (Tracy, California).
3. Flashers on Stop Signs.
4. Neon "RR SIGNALS AHEAD" Sign (New Jersey)
5. Cantilever Red and Yellow Flashers (Indiana).
6. Yellow Flashers on Standard Advance Warning.
7. Texas System of Advance Warning.
Proposed Active Advance Warning Devices
1. Illuminated "STOP AHEAD" Sign
2. In-Vehicle Real Time Warning.
3. Variable Message Signs.
Implemented Active Devices at the Crossing
1. Ohio Special Lights and Signs.
2. Standard Traffic Signals in Lieu of Flashers (Michigan,
others)
.
3. "WAIT - 2 TRAINS" Sign (Illinois).
4. Missouri Blinking Light.
5. Rotating Red Light with Highway Signal (California).
6. Indiana Green Light Signal (Monon Green).
Proposed Active Devices at the Crossing
1. Arizona Cantilever Crossbuck and Flasher Sign.
2. Various Light-Related Information Sources for the Crossing.
Some of the above innovations in the "implemented" category
reported positive results, others did not. In most cases, however, no
tests had been conducted to test their effectiveness. Some of the ideas
in the "proposed" category could have merit, but they need to be imple-
mented and tested. The relatively few innovations that have been
implemented nationwide, with or without an adequate research program
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to measure their effectiveness, appears to be a result of general
reluctance to allow installation and testing of new methods.
The reader is referred to Butcher's study for a complete review
of these innovative devices. It is of greater significance herein to
note that there are not only few of these devices available; but that
it is difficult to field test such devices. Questions of liability
and cost apportionment are difficult to resolve. The Indiana Green
Light Signal will be reviewed at greater length because information on
this device is not generally available.
In the case of the Indiana Green Light Signal, or "Monon Green,"
Butcher made field observations at several locations where this signal
is in use. This signal is only employed at locations where regular
active protection would not be justified, such as low volume rural
roads, especially those with poor sight distance and some private
crossings. None are installed on Federal Aid Secondary or high volume
roads. These devices are installed by only one railroad, Monon (now
part of the Louisville and Nashville RR) , and usually as the result of
local pressure.
This installation is described as follows (29):
The regular crossbuck is supplemented with a highway
traffic "STOP" sign installed on each side of the
crossing with an additional sign reading "When Light
is Out." Adjacent to the "STOP" sign is an 8-foot
mast with back-to-back traffic light units with green
lenses. The green light is tied to the Railroads' APB
block system circuits. The traffic light heads utilize
67-watt 120-volt bulbs displaying a green light to
motorists approaching the crossing, provided no train
has preempted the XR relay. On the approach of a train,
the relay is de-energized and the green light is
extinguished.
These "Monon Green Signals" (as they are commonly called) appear
to be effective. Requests by local public bodies that the railroad
install several more, indicate local public acceptance and confidence in
the signal. The state has never considered use of the signal, and does
not anticipate doing so because they are not authorized by the MUTCD.
Also, their effectiveness has never really been proven and there is a
possibility that they could confuse someone not familiar with them.
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Hopkins and Hazel eloquently pinpoint the problem of field testing
an innovative device (9):
If the new system in some way conflicts with the operation
of the original, very severe problems will result; no
railroad is likely to risk an accident with an admittedly
experimental protective system, and no other body (such as
government) can be expected to accept full liability,
particularly in this difficult area. (A common aspect
of lawsuits is the alleged failure of the signals.)
This difficulty is met directly when new signal devices,
rather than activation techniques, are considered. In
this second case, one must consider not only the technical
operation, but how motorists will respond to a different
means of indicating the imminent passage of a train. The
victim of an accident under these circumstances may have
a legitimate complaint that he did not understand the
meaning of the warning. One can imagine the legal com-
plexities which would result. Thus, beyond the question
of reliability, any system which presents a significantly
changed aspect to the motorist poses a real challenge in
the evaluation of its effectiveness, not only in devising
and. interpreting tests, but also in implementing them in
actual service.
The funding of grade crossing protection systems is a problem,
particularly those off the federal aid system. Of the estimated 223,000
grade crossings in the U. S., 174,000 are off the aid system (1, 2).
Many of these crossings are low-volume, low-hazard potential crossings;
however, together they do account for 60 percent of the vehicle- train
accidents (1, 2). Also, they account for 45 percent of the crossings
that the FHWA Report to Congress recommends be improved.
The superiority of automatic, active signal devices at grade
crossings is generally accepted. Funding and allocation of costs are
serious drawbacks to the more widespread use of train-activated pro-
tective devices at approximately 175,000 grade crossings that do not
have such protection.
Hopkins and Hazel (9) looked at the high-cost aspect of active
protective devices as well as train-speed predictor systems. Their
research dealt with the actual hardware in an attempt to design low
cost components. They also studied the many problems associated with
general acceptance and application of such new devices.
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Hopkins and Hazel also consider cost-effectiveness, focused on the
"more explicitly technological aspects" of the problem. They also give
a perspective on the technology and the testing of new devices that is
worth repeating (9):
Technology will offer no easy answers, and, indeed,
may make the task still more difficult. The variety
of grade crossings, the complexities of human
behavior, the weakness of existing data, and the
basic rarity of crossing accidents (approximately 70
years between deaths at an average crossing) reduce
any test and demonstration program, even if fairly
elaborate, to little more than a good indicator,
rather than definitive proof of effectiveness. It
will be necessary, from time to time, to make deci-
sions with quite inadequate information, based as
much on intuition, experience, and wisdom as on
engineering data.
Hopkins and Hazel (9) have an interesting approach to determine
"warranted protection expenditures" for various classes of passive
crossings. It is unique in that it establishes a range of warranted
expense guidelines for expenditures within the bounds of cost-
effectiveness criteria. The approach is summarized in the following
paragraphs.
Using annual accident prediction equations for passive crossings
developed by Schoppert (13), estimates of the number of these crossings
in each of 36 different classes of rail and highway traffic, and taking
the average cost of an accident as $20,000, data were developed
covering all passively protected crossings, including the following
data:
a. Number of crossings in category
b. Number of years between accidents
c. Annual fatalities (total) for category (there is approximately
one fatality for e^jery five accidents, so calculation of years
between fatalities of annual accident rate is a trivial
operation)
d. Annual accident cost per crossing.
Initial investment was charged at 5% of initial cost per year and
maintenance also 5% of initial cost per year. For a favorable benefit
cost ratio:
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Annual Accident Cost > Maintenance + Amortization
or > 10% of initial cost
Thus; Initial Cost < 10 x Annual Cost
The report's contention is that the cost of a protective system
must be less than 10 times the predicted cost of accidents if protection
is to be warranted on a cost-benefit criteria. Combining this concept with
the data and grouping into expense classes, result in the breakdown in
Table 5.
It is assumed that the degree of protection afforded in each case
will reduce the cost of future accidents to zero, i.e., be 100% effec-
tive. Also, three types of data are not included: 1) motorist delay,
2) non-train accidents, 3) railroad expense other than maintenance.
The authors "admit" that the analysis is "sufficiently crude" that
a correction for motorist delay would be meaningless. They further
point out limitations to a strict application of cost-benefit criterion
(19): 1) the task of taking and maintaining a fully adequate grade
crossing inventory and keeping all parameters current, is such an
extremely difficult task that any single piece of data must be viewed
with skepticism, 2) accident data are similar (in respect to #1) and
the past history of accident data has been one of \ery cursory investi-
gation, 3) even assuming adequate data there are both costs and benefits
either inadvertently, or through impossibility to measure, that are
ignored.
In presenting the limitations of their approach, Hopkins and Hazel
appear to have no less a valid approach than can be found in the litera-
ture. They are, perhaps, more "honest" in the presentation of the
various shortcomings of their study. It is believed that one conclusion
merits emphasis (9):
... It is found that a ^ery large number of crossings
warrant only yery limited expense and account for a
very small percentage of deaths.
This report also deals with the actual hardware of innovative
devices, such as, "micro-wave telemetry alternative to conventional
track circuits and possible crossing-located radar and impedance train
detection systems." It is appropriate to review the types of
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TABLE 5. CATEGORIZATION OF GRADE CROSSINGS WITH PASSIVE PROTECTION,




2 $300 - $1000
3 $1000 - $3000
4 $3000 - $10,000
5 $10,000 - $30,000
6 $30,000 - $100,000
7 $100,000 - $300,000










65,100 7 $ 0.7 Million
48,350 29 $ 2.9 Million
32,540 55 $ 5.5 Million
15,510 84 $ 8.4 Million
13,950 222 $22.2 Million
3,480 215 $21.5 Million
1,530 272 $27.2 Million
630 345 $34.5 Million
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"Appropriate Protection Devices" that the authors suggest as being
appropriate to the cost-effective cost range for each class. These are
presented in Table 6.
Real-Time Information Systems
Several projects have been concerned with real time information
systems for drivers. Heathington (31) used an attitudinal survey to
evaluate driver attitudes towards a Freeway Driver Information System
(FDIS). The research included an evaluation of the willingness of
Chicago area drivers to pay for an information system on Chicago
expressways, an evaluation of the likelihood of diversion to alterna-
tive routes when given specific information on freeway conditions, and
an evaluation of the specific messages to be used for three levels of
congestion. The transportation improvement considered most important
by the Chicago drivers surveyed was the improvement of the riding
surface on expressways. Also important was the provision of electronic
signs giving information that Chicago drivers placed on real time
information. With regards to the specific sign messages on the FDIS,
the respondents indicated a preference for traffic information over
non-traffic information at all levels of congestion. Therefore, even
if no congestion exists, the drivers desired to be told that no con-
gestion exists rather than be told nothing.
Hoff (32) looked at alternative methods of communicating with
drivers. He examined different traffic information techniques which
might be used to divert drivers around congested areas of the highway
system. A questionnaire was developed to determine the preference of
the driver for six alternative methods of communication. The ordered
preference of Chicago drivers for methods of receiving information
concerning freeway conditions was as follows:
1. changeable message sign,
2. symbolic map with arrows and streets,
3. symbolic map with arrows,
4. commercial radio,
5. roadside radio, and
6. experience.
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1 Under $300 65,100
2 $300 - $1000 48,350
3 $1000 - $3000 32,540
TABLE 6. RELEVANT PROTECTION DEVICES FOR VARIOUS CLASSES OF GRADE
CROSSINGS (Source: Ref. 9, p. 75)













5 $10,000 - $30,000 13,950 Conventional Systems of
Improved Effectiveness-
Gates, Uniform Warning Time
6 $30,000 - $100,000 3,480 Combinations of Above;
More Complex Installations
7 $100,000 - $300,000 1,530 More Elaborate Installa-
tions; Interconnection with
Highway Signals; Emphasis on
Reduction of Motorist Delay





Dudek and Jones (33) also evaluated real time visual displays for
urban freeways. This research was directed toward the development of
functional requirements for a real time freeway communication system
for urban areas. The researchers felt that it was essential that the
motoring public play a major role in establishing the functional
requirements of the system, since the system must fulfill their needs.
Their research was directed toward evaluating driver attitudes concern-
ing the need for real time information, the potential use and response
to real time information, driver preferences for mode of communication,
the type of information desired, the priorities for the location of
information, and driver comprehension of and preferences for visual
displays. The surveyed Texas drivers were given three alternatives
for real time information. The three alternatives were: 1) real time
information, 2) additional guide signs, and 3) other (to be filled in
by the respondent). The results indicate a preference for real-time
information over additional guide signs. Only a small number of
respondents filled in an alternative type of system. Their findings
also indicated that Texas drivers preferred simple descriptive and
color-coded displays over more complicated displays involving diagrams.
Dudek and Cummings (34) also evaluated alternative information
systems. The main objective of this study was to investigate the
application of commercial radio to freeway communication. As a part
of this study alternative modes of communicating with drivers were
evaluated using an attitudinal questionnaire. This survey of Texas






They concluded, however, that no appreciable differences existed between
the radio and sign modes. For all practical purposes, the ratio and
sign modes of furnishing freeway information were considered equal.
This research concerning driver information systems indicates that
improved driver communication is desired by drivers. A logical extension
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of this research would be the application of the technology developed
to other traffic situations. One extension is the evaluation of advanced
warning systems for railroad grade crossing protection. Trabald and
Prewitt (35) designed an Experimental Route Guidance System. The ERGS
type system could be used to give drivers visual information inside
vehicles concerning the hazard at railroad crossings and other highway
hazards. A roadside radio communication system could also be used to
provide audio warning messages at railroad crossings and other highway
hazards (36). Finally, a changeable-message, advance warning sign could
be used to provide advance warning at highway-railway grade crossings.
Urbanik (38) directed attention toward improving safety measures
at individual crossings by improving the warning system. The effective-
ness of basj'c information supplied to the motorist was determined.
Attitudinal surveys were used in order to: 1) evaluate driver attitudes
concerning the hazards at railraod grade crossings, 2) evaluate driver
priorities for improving safety at railroad grade crossings, 3) evaluate
warning systems for railroad grade crossings and 4) develop a typical
design for a new advance warning system.
Significant results of the study were (38):
1. The respondents considered railroad grade crossings to be
the most hazardous of the situations that were compared,
i.e., more hazardous than signalized intersections, yield
controlled intersections, cross roads and curves.
2. The improvement of the safety at railroad grade crossings
was considered very important by all 259 respondents.
3. An overhead changeable message sign was the most preferred
warning system at railroad grade crossings by all 259
respondents, (preferred to standard flashing lights, in-car
audio message, in-car visual message and the present
standard passive advance warning sign).
Also significant was the fact that the passive advance warning
sign, currently standard, was the least preferred method of warning.
Changeable message signs are signs that can display one or more
alternative message, e.g., variable speed signs, warning signs for bad
weather or accidents, signs used to give freeway conditions, etc. The
Chicago Area Expressway Surveillance Project conducted a substantial
amount of research using variable message, electronic signs (39, 40, 41).
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The electronic capabilities of these signs are currently sufficient to
provide the desired warning messages with a high degree of reliability.
Changeable message signs have been used to a limited degree for
several years. Maintenance difficulties, however, were common and the
reliability of the signs was questionable.
Recently, electronic solid state concepts have evolved for change-
able message displays that provide these systems with simple operation,
lower operational cost and lower maintenance, i.e., improved reliability.
The potential of these new systems which incorporate modern technology
appears to be much greater than the "old" systems of a few years ago--
certainly enough potential to be thoroughly investigated.
It was concluded by Urbanik (38) that the logical extension of his
research was to evaluate all aspects of a variable message sign in a
field installation, implementing the overhead, changeable message sign
at high-speed, high-hazard grade crossings.
Data from a recent Indiana report (42) indicate that there are
about 100 grade crossings in the state whose hazard index by the New
Hampshire formula is high, some over 100,000, and additional protection
is considered desirable (A hazard index of 4000 is considered sufficient
to warrant additional protection.) Several crossings on this list
should probably be considered for grade-separation structures if more
money were available; however, Indiana cost estimates range from
$300,000 for a two-lane roadway to $800,000 for separating a four-lane
roadway (38). Improved advance warning systems should have the
capability of improving the safety at such highway-railway grade
crossings at a fraction of the cost of grade separations.
Responsibility for Grade Crossing Protection
A joint action group on grade crossing safety (FRA/FHWA) was formed
in 1967 to investigate many facets of the problem. One area of study
is the allocation of responsibility for grade crossing safety improve-
ments between public and private agencies. The importance of this area
must be emphasized because many times lack of agreement in this area
delays or obstructs the improvement of grade-crossing protective
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devices— particularly in the area of new or innovative devices and
research programs to evaluate their effectiveness.
Although the railroads certainly carry the bulk of the financial
burden for grade crossing protection, the trend is toward greater public
participation. Hopkins points out (31):
The growth of public involvement might not seem note-
worthy to the casual observer. The basic function of
crossing protection is, after all, to alert the
motorist to a possible hazard - a responsibility
normally assumed by governmental bodies for virtually
all other potential dangers on highways. However,
historical, technical, and legal considerations have
traditionally lodged the primary burden of protection
on the railroads. The movement away from that arrange-
ment has arisen from a number of factors, which include
the great increase in highway traffic, the diminished
role of railroads as the predominant transportation
mode, the impediment to efficient implementation of
protection programs caused by diffusion of functions
among numerous public and private bodies, and the
ever greater degree to which public funds are involved.
Collier (43) notes the very significant change in the "old" concept
of railroad responsibility. However, he also notes that states could
legally and constitutionally require the railroads to bear the entire
responsibility, which is what happened in a U. S. Supreme Court Case
1
as late as 1965. This issue is far from being completely resolved.
It has been previously mentioned that researchers have, primarily,
had to work with accident data which were related to crossing parameters
obtained from the accident reports and/or inventories. It has also been
emphasized that the general quality of available data is poor, and most
inventory data are questionable because of the changing nature of the
parameters from year to year. A complete, nationwide inventory is
essential to establish a comprehensive data base. The U. S. Department
of Transportation and the railroad industry have begun (1974) to
develop a centralized, comprehensive, national railroad-highway grade
crossing data system (44, 45). The resulting computerized data base
will be used as the main source of information for planning, implementing,
and evaluating all improvement programs.
1 Florida East Coast Railway vs Martin County, Florida, 171 So. 2d. 837,
Cert. den. by the U. S. Supreme Court in 382 U. S. 834 (1965).
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Driver Reaction to Grade-Crossings
Accidents are symptoms of a problem. In spite of many projects
based on the study of accident records, the problem is not well under-
stood. There has been little research to determine the nature of the
driver-grade crossing interaction. There have been only two research
projects that have specifically addressed the problem of driver-grade
crossing interaction. In addition, the Voorhee's Report (13) reviewed
the "human factors" literature for driver characteristics that could be
related to recommendations for improved protection systems at grade
crossings.
Applications of Human Factors
The Voorhees Report (13) presented an extensive review of human
factors, principles and considerations that could be applied to grade-
crossing protective devices that would have more impact upon the driver
and alert him to his responsibility to note the danger ahead. They
present the problem as two-fold; 1) the driver must be aware that there
is a crossing ahead and initiate certain perceptual and driving patterns
and, 2) a secondary set of stimuli must alert the driver when a train is
actually approaching the crossing. There has not been much effort to
solve the "grade-crossing problem" by a human factors approach but a
summary of pertinent considerations (as applied to drivers and their
reaction to signs in general) should be helpful (13):
... in formulating not only specific solutions to
specific problems, but also general principles of
design and application to new systems to reduce
accidents at highway-rail grade crossings.
The following recommendations were made for consideration in the
design of improved grade crossing warning systems (13):
1. Make greater use of color and shape coding than has
previously been the case. -
2. Where possible, provide adequate illumination for each
crossing.
3. Provide adequate advance warning for every crossing.
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4. Make use of cross-modality stimulation; specifically,
investigate the feasibility of rumble strips (tactual
and auditory stimulation), horns (auditory stimulations),
etc.
5. Provide redundant information, both by repetition of
the message and by cross-modality stimulation.
6. Utilize the intermittent stimulation principle for all
automatic signals.
7. Utilize automatic signals whenever possible; when not
possible, provide unique, nonautomatic warnings with
greater impact than the standard nonautomatic warning.
That is, crossings without activated signals should be
marked quite differently from those with activated
signals so that the driver, upon approaching them, is
made aware of the fact that it is his responsibility to
determine whether or not a train is approaching.
8. Insure a minimum amount of distracting or irrelevant
information by removing all extraneous messages from
the immediate vicinity of the crossing.
9. Use warning devices of greater impact for isolated
crossings.
10. Investigate the feasibility of providing the driver
with prior information about crossing density and
train traffic volume.
11. Incorporate some features of existing warning systems
into any new and novel systems developed, to prevent
adverse effects from negative transfer of old habits.
12. Provide the traffic engineer with warrants for crossing
protection devices that are sufficiently flexible to
permit him to utilize unique warning "packages" for
unique crossing situations. A set of such warning
packages, graded according to impact or attention value,
could be part of the traffic engineer's arsenal.
Sanders (20, 3) investigated driver reaction to grade crossings.
Inferences were drawn by recording driver-related variables at specific
crossings rather than from accident reports (20, 3). Butcher (29)
also investigated this problem. Sanders first report was primarily an
attempt to provide the U. S. Department of Transportation with a data
base that would reflect the behavior of motorists in the vicinity of
grade crossings (20). One anticipated benefit was to supply information
that could be used to determine values of vehicle delay for the time-
delay portion of economic models or warrants.
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The Speed Profile Study
"A Traffic Evaluator System" was used to instrument the highway at
five points, roughly at 1,000 feet and 100 feet each side of the cross-
ing and at the crossing. Each vehicle was tracked passing through the
array, determining speed, lane change behavior, headway, wheelbase, and
number of axles. Manual inputs were added to indicate vehicles which
were required to stop, the actuation of protective devices, the arrival
of trains and train speed. The result was a "stratified base" of over
40,000 vehicles from 26 crossings with parameters of urban/rural,
two/four lane, high/low volume, and active/passive grade crossing
protection (20).
All data that was analyzed were taken under dry pavement conditions.
Other data were taken and included in the data base, but those data
which were not comparable among all sites were not analyzed. As stated
in the report (20):
Analysis of behavior during specific transition periods
such as from day to night or dry pavement to snow could
produce valuable results, therefore this data has been
retained and is available for further study.
Speed profiles, limited to only passenger cars that did not stop
(for train or any other reason), were drawn for each of the 26 crossings
of the study. Passenger car average speed was plotted against distance
from the crossing, which were variable distances depending upon where
the contacts of the Traffic Evaluator sensors were placed on the pave-
ment. A typical profile is shown as Figure 3.
A summary graph was prepared to illustrate the delay experienced
by motorists by level of protection. This graph is shown as Figure 4.
The mean car speed was converted to percentage of entry speed to
"normalize" the effect of differences in normal free speeds at the 26
different crossings.
Significant conclusions included (20);
1. The reduction in speed measured from a large distance
from the crossing, to the speed at the crossing, varied
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2 Evaluating the 45 cars that crossed an active crossing
within one minute of a train arrival, 7 crossed while
the signals were flashing. The reason appeared to be
excessive warning time.
3. Legislation requiring buses to stop at all crossings
appears to be unobserved and unenforced, based on 53
percent of the school buses and 88 percent of the
commercial buses not stopping.
4. Speed reductions at sites having passive protection are
both greater and occur sooner than at sites with active
protection.
5 At rural sites, the difference in percent speed reduc-
tion for both types of protection are smaller than for
urban.
The Human Factors Study
Sanders (3) reported on a human factors related study, undertaken
to support a subsequent evaluation of alternative grade crossing
acci-
dent countermeasures. This July 1973 report is one of the most
recent
and one of only three (3, 20, 29) that could be considered basic
research on driver reaction to grade crossings, i.e., primarily
field
research of driver parameters. This report by Sanders is the only
one
that specifically attempts to relate human factor parameters from
both
the literature and roadside interviews to actual driver performance
in
the vicinity of crossings. Interviews taken past the crossing
were
matched with the driver's actual performance through the system.
The objectives of this study were many. Very briefly they covered
the areas of providing guidelines for the development of countermeasure
concepts, selecting countermeasures for field testing, evaluation of
the countermeasures and experimental design and procedures. Three
data
collection procedures were used; namely, the traffic evaluator system,
time lapse photography, and motorist response to questionnaires within
the inference space of the study. It was concluded that driver looking
behavior, 1 crossing speed and speed reduction were sufficient and valid
1 Looking behavior could only be easily evaluated at crossings with
restricted sight distance and where drivers tended to make an obvious
head movement as soon as they were "past the restriction." Head move-
ment could not generally be clearly observed where sight distance was
unrestricted. Thus, this is a restricted parameter.
48
measures of performance to evaluate changes in protective
systems. The
Traffic Evaluator road switch placements are shown in Figure
5a. These
placements were closer at distances near the crossing in an attempt
to
equalize travel time between contacts as vehicles slowed for
the cross-
ing. Figure 5b shows typical speed profiles at several sets
of crossings.
To meet the many, diverse objectives of their study (3), a four-
phase approach was used. Phase I was a review of a selected
sample of
accidents. Phase II was the establishment of human factor norms
with
respect to driver knowledge, attitude, and behavior to serve
as standards
of comparison of "before" and "after" studies of specific
grade crossing
sites and provided measures of effectiveness. Phase III was a
"pilot"
validation study to test the standards and measures of effectiveness
of the previous phase. Phase IV was the experimental design
for plan-
ning large scale experimentation.
In the attempt to find a particular subgroup of high-risk grade
crossing accident drivers characterized on psychophysiological
dimensions,
none was found. The most significant finding was a demonstrated
degrada-
tion with age.
Installation of flashing lights on each side of a standard, advance
warning sign was evaluated to field test the parameters: 1) speed
change and 2) looking behavior. Data were taken "before" and
"after,"
i.e., the three conditions of 1) existing protection 2) dim flashers
and 3) bright flashers. A plot showing the speed change is shown
in
Figure 6a. A "t" test of the means showed that there were significant
differences before and after mean values of both speeds and looking
behavior.
A higher percentage of drivers stopped for both the flashers than
the existing protection as shown in Figure 6b. Two conclusions were
drawn: 1) The modification caused a short term modification of behavior
and 2) The parameters speed and looking behavior are sufficiently
sensitive to that change to indicate a significant result.
Another parameter evaluated was "zone of maximum deceleration."
Mean deceleration was calculated for each of five segments of approach









FIGURE 5a Placement of vehicle sensors in advance of grade crossings.
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FIGURE 5b Speed profiles of drivers for four sets of crossings
divided by the most safe and least safe index quart! I e.



































FIGURE 6a Comparisons of measures for entry speeds (43 )
and exit speeds ( 10* ) and looking behavior for















FIGURE 6b Percent of drivers who stopped at the crossing
for both directions under three experimental
conditions.
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Speed change per s egment
Deceleration = time to travel segment
It was stated in the report (3):
The magnitude of the maximum deceleration correlates
highly with the percent speed reduction (over 0.62
in all cases)
.
The maximum deceleration was found to occur about 45 feet from the
crossing leading Sanders to conclude that the population waits as long
as possible before slowing to the speed at which they desire to cross
the tracks (3)
.
Another parameter that was examined by Sanders was critical
distance, that is (3):
as a vehicle approaches the grade crossing along
the mean speed profile, there is a point at which
he cannot stop his car short of the tracks
If a train is approaching at this point, the driver's only alternative
to a collision is to beat the train to the crossing.
Finally, in regard to the above four parameters, a "behavior index
of safety" was developed.
Safety Index = looking + speed reduction
- maximum deceleration point
- critical distance
Because of large differences in relative magnitude the above param-
eters were normalized, i.e. (3),
the mean value within each site for each measure was
subtracted from the measure to scale it to a mean
of zero, and then divided by the site standard devia-
tion of the measure to normalize the value
It was concluded that the contribution of protection improvement
(counter-measure) can be determined at a specific site by a before and
after study using only (as a minimum) vehicle speed and looking behavior.
Evaluation of the Literature
It is clear from studying the literature that there has been little
research directed explicitly toward driver reaction to grade crossing
systems. This is true both in regard to systems as a whole and to a
particular system. The three that were so directed (3, 20, 29) showed
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that parameters to evaluate the effectiveness or change
in effectiveness
at a grade crossing are illusive. Sanders (20) concluded
that speed
and looking behavior were sufficient but speed is not believed
to be
a major factor in grade crossing accidents and looking behavior can
only be measured under restricted conditions.
In the past few years, there has been considerable research
directed toward solving the "grade crossing problem." Review
of this
research reveals that it has been almost exclusively "accident
record-
based. The drawbacks and weaknesses in accident data have been
pointed
out. These are in addition to the obvious weakness of time,
i.e., at an
individual crossing one cannot judge improvement effectiveness with
accident history over a short time period.
Numbers of accidents can be predicted with some degree of
success
according to groups of crossings and by protection type. However,
at a
specific crossing this type of analysis has little validity.
Thousands
of grade crossings apparently do not warrant gates, or even
flashers,
or if they do money is not available, and yet people are killed.
There
is a need, then, for parameters to effectively evaluate lower-cost
systems to more effectively alert the potential victim.
Human factors research to identify this potential victim is
lacking
in the literature. The Voorhees Report (13) reviewed driver
character-
istics and made recommendations for better warning signs. Sanders (3)
attempted to apply human factors to selecting improvement strategies
and then field evaluated a system so selected using the approach
speed
and looking behavior parameters with some success. However, his
human
factors approach did not pinpoint a high-risk subgroup of drivers,
perhaps there is none, except as affected severely by advanced age.
The above approaches, particularly the field evaluations, are
valuable contributions, however there are weaknesses. For example, one
has to assume that lower mean approach speeds means less accidents.
Also, that the driver who turns his head sees, comprehends and properly
evaluates the conditions. In addition there is no way to equate speed
or speed change and/or percent of "looking drivers" to accident predic-
tion, probability of occurrence, or predicted change, particularly in
the long run.
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In regard to Sanders (3) field test that had great short-term
effect on reducing speed, increasing looking, and causing drivers to
stop (refer to Figures 7 and 8) one caution is in order. This writer
believes the results are most likely because the driver "feels" this
flasher is train activated. In other words, he had been "fooled" into
believing a train was approaching. In the long run this type of
improvement approach could be dangerous. This, and other facets of the
problem need to be further studied.
In summary, little is really known regarding driver reaction to
different grade crossing systems or even to the same system under varying
conditions. Parameters to measure reactions are unproven, particularly
as to their effect on safety. Nevertheless, research in these areas
must continue to better understand the problems and not just the
symptons - accidents.
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CHAPTER 3: PURPOSE AND SCOPE
In early 1972, the Indiana State Highway Commission sought an
immediate solution for a grade-crossing where pressure by the press and
local citizens was mounting because of a high accident and death record.
This location was the crossing of U. S. 31, a four-lane, 65 mph (posted)
highway, and Norfolk and Western (N & W) tracks near Goldsmith, Indiana.
A three phase research proposal was initially prepared:
1. Install traffic signal type overhead red flashers on
cantilever arms over the highway at the crossing,
activated with the standard railroad flashers.
2. Install an overhead luminaire to illuminate the crossing
during passage of a train, activated concurrently with
the overhead flashers.
3. Install automatic gates.
The first two systems were to be installed and maintained by the
Indiana State Highway Commission with no railroad participation in the
cost; however, N & W Railroad was asked to provide a relay switch to
activate them concurrently with the railroad flashers. The automatic
gates were to be negotiated and installed through the usual State-
Rail raod procedures for upgrading protection at any grade crossing.
It was planned to obtain data after each improvement was made, in
addition to the initial data base or "before" data. The Highway Com-
mission engineers recognized that too little is known about the real
causes of accidents such as these, and also recognized that no matter
what improvement program was undertaken they had no measure of
effectiveness to determine how much they had improved the situation.
The primary purpose of the research, then, was to determine
quantitatively the degree of effectiveness of each of the planned
improvements and to develop methodology to evaluate the effectiveness
of similar improvements at other grade crossings. This included the
development of simple techniques capable of measuring parameters
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whose characteristics were found to be related to the degree or quality
of improvement.
Spot speed at specific points on the approaches was selected as
the parameter most likely to be related to the degree of improvement.
Such speeds taken at several points of approaching drivers provided an
"approach-speed profile" for each driver. Inferences from the evalua-
tion of these approach-speed profiles and changes in them due to each
improvement (or due to change of conditions within a particular system)
were used to evaluate the effectiveness of the improvements.
A secondary purpose was to evaluate speed data as a measure of
drivers' reactions and characteristics to a high-speed rural, grade
crossing.
It was decided to use a 16 mm movie camera to obtain the speed
data quickly and cheaply. Details of the system are presented in
Chapter 4.
During the period of time that the data collection system at the
Goldsmith grade crossing was developed and while the before (phase I)
data collection was in progress (Spring 1972), serious administrative
problems developed on the overall project. The original concept of a
3-phase improvement program had to be scrapped due to inability to
negotiate necessary State-Railroad agreements. Ultimately (May 1973),
only one improvement, the automatic gate system, was installed at the
grade crossing. The primary purpose of the research then became the
analysis of the effect of the automatic gate system and driver reaction
to it and other site conditions.
Because of the one year delay between the collection of the
phase I data and the installation of automatic gates, "before" data
were analyzed and reported by Butcher as part of an Interim Report,
"Evaluation of Safety Improvements at Highway-Railway Grade Crossings."
This report on the phase I portion of this project is summarized in
Chapter 4.
After the gates were installed, a three week delay was allowed for
local drivers to become accustomed to the new system. Data collection
for the after condition (phase II) then commenced. At the end of data
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collection for phase II, an analysis was made of the complete before
and after data sets.
Additional speed profile data were available from another research
study, an FHWA research project previously summarized in the literature
review and referred to as the Sanders study (20). It was implied by
Sanders that this data base contained valuable, unanalyzed raw data on
motorists' approach speed profiles under varying conditions. The data
consequently were secured from FHWA and analyzed in an attempt to
supplement the Goldsmith analysis. This analysis is reported in
Chapter 6.
Specific Objectives
The specific objectives of the research at the Goldsmith grade
crossing were as follows:
1. To determine the effectiveness of the automatic gate
system by an analysis of the before and after approach
speed profiles and related parameters.
2. To evaluate speed and related parameters (such as,
deceleration rates, above pace speeds, high speeds,
speed distributions, etc.) as sensitive measures of
significant changes in effectiveness.
3. To evaluate site conditions and accident history with
the danger associated with this crossing and with
driver approach speeds and characteristics.
4. To evaluate the effectiveness of the selected filming
system for data collection.
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CHAPTER 4: SUMMARY OF INTERIM REPORT ON THE
GOLDSMITH GRADE CROSSING 1
Orientation of the Goldsmith Crossing
The crossing is located approximately one mile north of the inter-
section of U. S. 31 and State Road 28, which is controlled by traffic
light signals. U. S. 31 is a four-lane divided highway, with north-
south orientation over level terrain. Lane widths are twelve feet and
the median is 66 feet in width. Posted speed is 65 miles per hour, and
the 85th and 15th percentile speeds are 66 and 50 respectively. The
highway ADT is approximately 10,000 vehicles.
The railroad track is a single main line track oriented at 90°
with the highway, in an east west direction. There are about six
freight trains (no passenger trains) operated on an "as needed" basis
with a speed range from 20 to 60 miles per hour. The track is level
and on tangent for at least a mile in each direction from the highway
and elevated above the surrounding fields each side of the crossing.
The crossing itself was relatively smooth at the beginning of the
project. However, during the after phase of the project, the crossing
was completely renovated as part of a highway resurfacing project on
U. S. 31.
County Road 100 S parallels the rail tracks on their south side.
It is gravel surfaced and carries very light volumes. Its inter-
section with U. S. 31 is controlled by stop signs. Yield signs are
placed in the crossover of the median between the U. S. 31 approaches.
Separate railroad flashers are directed toward traffic entering U. S. 31
from this road. The layout is shown in Figure 7.








SCHEMATIC VIEW OF THE U.S. 3I-N&W
GRADE CROSSING SITE NEAR TIPTON,
INDIANA (BEFORE IMPROVEMENT)
(REF. 29, p. 56)
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Sight distance along the railroad track for approaching motorists
is relatively unobstructed in three quadrants. In the southwest
quadrant sight distance of a train is restricted to about 200 feet,
because of a woods, for northbound motorists. For such a northbound
motorist, an eastbound train is not clearly visible at the time the
signals are activated. When the crop in the southeast quadrant is
corn, an obstruction to sight distance could also exist there for a
portion of the year. In the northwest quadrant, the field is depressed
enough below the road and track that sight distance over crops is
unobstructed. However, the wooded area south of and parallel to the
track west of the highway presents for southbound traffic a poor
background, i.e., a dark train against the dark background creates
little contrast and may have the effect of camouflaging a train. From
personal observation the author is of the opinion that under certain
conditions, this condition may be serious, perhaps even worse than a
sight obstruction. A similar condition exists to the east of the
crossing, although the trees do not closely parallel the track, but are
in the background. 1
Accident Record
In spite of all the apparent safe features of the site, such as,
level terrain, good sight distance, active protection, no-skew, no
curved alignment, etc., the accident record here has been one of the
worst in the State of Indiana, particularly in the last few years.
There have been a total of 38 accidents in 15Js years, including 8 fatal
accidents and 14 personal injury accidents which resulted in 13 deaths
(all since March 1965) and 26 injuries. Also, as can be seen from
Tables 7 and 8, almost all of the 38 total accidents at this crossing
have occurred during daylight hours with clear skies and dry pavements.
Eight of the 12 train-vehicle collisions occurred on the southbound
approach where a vehicle approaching the crossing has unobstructed
sight distance down the track to the west of h mile or more during the
1 This can be seen in Figures 15 and 16.
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TABLE 7 SUMMARY OF ACCIDENTS AT THE U. S. 31-N&W RR CROSSING SITE FOR
'
THE 15%- YEAR PERIOD, JANUARY 1, 1957 THROUGH JULY 1, 1972.
(Ref. 29, p. 60)
Accident Description: Total Accidents 38
Fatal Accidents 8
Personal Injury Accidents ... 14
Property Damage Accidents ... 16
Casualties: Total Fatalities 13
Total Personal Injuries. ... 26
Day of Occurrence: Weekday 30
Saturday or Sunday 8
Light Conditions: Daylight 29
Darkness 8
Dawn/Dusk 1
Vehicle Direction: Northbound 16
Southbound 22
Pavement Condition: Dry 31
Wet 5
Ice/Snow 2
Weather Condition: Clear 34
Raining 1
Snowing 3
Type of Accident: Rear End 17
Right Angle 2
Sideswipe 2
Car Hit Train 7
Train Hit Car 5
Other. 5
Train Involvement: Train Present and Involved. . . 12
Train Present, Not Involved . . 12
Train Not Present 14
Accidents Involving Movements From or Onto
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entire last h mile of his approach to the
crossing and almost as much
to the east. A complete analysis of the
accident record will be made
in Chapter 5.
The Data Collection System
The data required to determine driver
reaction were spot speeds at
sufficient locations to develop a speed
profile as a vehicle approached
the grade crossing. With these data
the vehicle's rate of deceleration
could be calculated and analyzed, and the
locations where the driver
made noticeable speed cahnges could be
determined.
As the Goldsmith project was initially conceived,
there were a
number of constraints on the development
of the data collection system,
primarily related to time. Data collection
had to be carried out without
delaying any improvements that were to be
made; thus, it had to be begun
at the earliest possible date. There
were also budget limitations, that
is large sums of money were not available.
Conception and design of
the system were limited to equipment that
was either on hand or available
quickly and at nominal cost, as well as one
that would not be apparent
to the average motorist. These constraints
led to the implementation of
a photographic system employing a 16 mm
variable speed movie camera that
could be rented from the Audio-Visual
Department.
A camera setup position was determined for
each approach approxi-
mately 750 feet from the roadway and 600 feet
from the railway track.
Markers were placed in pairs, parallel to the
highway, such that each
pair intersected the line of sight from the
camera to a 55 foot speed
"trap " By filming a vehicle at a set film
speed, and counting the
frames of the developed film that it took a
vehicle to traverse a pair
of markers, frame counts were converted to
the average speed of the
vehicle between marker pairs. This average
speed of a vehicle over a
55-foot trap length was assumed to be the vehicle's
spot speed at the
center of the trap. The photographing setup
is shown in Figure 8.
Each marker was a two- by-two -foot square
of sheet metal supported
in a diamond configuration on a steel post.
The markers were placed









1FIGURE 8= SCHEMATIC VIEW OF
MARKER PLACEMENT AND
CAMERA SETUP POSITION (REF.29p.67)
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viewed from the observation point. A close-up
of a typical trap with
markers is shown in Figure 9.
Table 9 lists the eight station designations
and their distance
from the nearest track to the center of trap,
the point at which the
spot speed was measured.
TABLE 9. NUMBERS AND LOCATIONS FOR THE
EIGHT SPOT SPEED STATIONS ON
EACH APPROACH
Station Distance from Nearest Track










Markers were painted white on the side facing the camera
and green
on the side facing the highway. The posts were
also painted green. This
was an effort to make the markers as inconspicuous
as possible to passing
motorists and as visible as possible on the film. The
camera set-up
position was assumed to be far enough off the roadway
such that no
camouflage was necessary.
The photographic equipment was leased from the
Audio-Visual Depart-
ment of Purdue University. The camera was a 16 mm
Ariflex-M motion
picture camera, powered by an eight volt rechargeable
battery and having
a 400-foot film capacity. A 12-120 mm Augeneux zoom
lens was used in
order to provide close-up views of the vehicles over the
required dis-
tance. The lens had to be near full zoom in order to
accurately count
the frames that were shot while following a vehicle
between marker
pairs. More correctly stated, the problem was less one
of following

















lined up with the markers at the trap end points.
That is, the magnifi-
cation of the lens was necessary to pinpoint a
marker against a vehicle
such as illustrated by still photography in Figure
9.
The camera was driven by a variable-speed electric
motor, equipped
with a tachometer calibrated in frames per second.
After an initial
check on film speed, made by photographing a stop
watch, indicated that
the tachometer was accurate, the speed indicated
by the tachometer was
thereafter assumed to remain accurate.
After the films were developed they were viewed by
the use of an
Industrialist sto-motion projector, modified (commercially) from a
Kodak Analyst projector. Each subject vehicle was followed
through
each of the eight speed traps. The number of movie
frames it took
the vehicle to traverse between the two markers
constituting a trap
was recorded to the nearest one-half of a frame.
This number of frames
was subsequently converted to miles per hour by the
formula:
(24 frames/sec) (3600 sec/hr) (55 feet)





An error of one-half of a frame in estimating the
total number of
frames would result in an error of slightly greater than
one mile per
hour for speeds lower than 50 mph and a slightly larger
error for speeds
over 50 mph.
Analysis of Phase I Data
All data were collected during daylight hours under
conditions of
clear visibility. In the experimental design, it was
decided to place
all vehicles into four basic categories; 1) "free flow
vehicles," 2)
"first unobstructed vehicles," 3) "first obstructed vehicles,"
and
4) "following vehicles." These categories are defined below:
A "free flow vehicle " is defined as one in which the
motorist
traWneTThrougTrthe approach with no train present and no
other vehicle between him and the crossing. In this
condition
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there was no stimulus other than the existence
of the
crossing itself and its unactivated devices.
A "first unobstructed vehicle" is defined
as one driven
Sy Th^ot^FT^rwT^nteTid-The first speed trap
while
the signals were flashing but chose to go
through the
cross ng without stopping, ahead of the train,
which was
not yet at the crossing. The added stimulus
was that of
the activated flashers and possibly sighting
of the
approach train.
A "first obstructed vehicle," is defined
as one in which
thelfibtonsTenleTed the first speed trap with the
flashers activated and a train already across
or about
to cross, the highway. The added stimulus
in this case
was the train across or close to the highway.
A "following vehicle" is defined as one
in which the
SotoTHFenferia-thT first speed trap under conditions
of siqnal activation, a train across the
highway and at
least one other vehicle already stopped at
the crossing




In order to minimize the influence of stimuli
other than the
prevailing conditions at the crossing, a free-flow
vehicle was sampled
only if there were no other moving vehicles
between it and the crossing
as it entered the first speed trap.
Basis of Comparison
As one basis for comparison of driver performance
in each of the
four vehicle categories, deceleration rates
were calculated for each
vehicle between each of the eight speed traps.
These deceleration rates
were placed into five classifications as derived
from guidelines in
The Traffic Engineering Handbook . The classes
were:
mass 1 -
"comfortable " 8 ft/sec/sec or less
Class 2 - " uncomfortable " >8 ft/sec/sec through 11
ft/sec/sec
Class 3 - " undesirable " >11 ft/sec/sec through 14
ft/sec/sec
Class 4 - " very- >14 ft/sec/sec through 20 ft/sec/sec
uncomfortable "
Class 5 -
"emergency " >20 ft/sec/sec
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Another method of comparison was to make statistical tests on
the
differences between mean entry speeds in the first trap for all
cate-
gories of vehicles on each approach. In particular, tests were made
for significant differences of the mean and variances of: 1)
free flow
car vs. first unobstructed car, 2) free flow car vs. first
obstructed
car, 3) free flow car vs. following car, 4) first unobstructed
car vs.
first obstructed car, 5) first unobstructed car vs. following car
and
6) first obstructed car vs. following car.
Speeds at the other traps for each category were also plotted,
and
compared as a percentage of entry speed for each group. These
speed
profiles were the third primary measure of driver reaction to the
cross-
ing protection system.
Conclusions: Phase I Data
Data Collection
First, it was concluded that the photographic data collection and
reduction process was adequate for determining speed profiles and rates
of vehicular deceleration at highway- rail way grade crossings. Many
grade crossings and other situations would be suitable for application
of this technique. In terms of being "quick, cheap and effective,"
it
proved to be especially advantageous.
Approach Speeds
Analysis of the data showed that motorists approaching this cross-
ing reacted differently depending upon the prevailing conditions
(stimuli) at the crossing. As a first step in the analysis, statistical
tests showed that there was a significant difference between mean
approach speeds from the south and the north. It was hypothesized that
this was because of the traffic signal one mile south of the crossing
and possibly because northbound drivers were more cautious due to poor
sight distance to the west. Data were analyzed separately for each
approach; however, except for slightly reduced mean speeds, results
were similar.
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Drivers who entered the approach when the signals
were activated
without a train immediately present (first unobstructed
vehicles)
entered the approach at "free-flow" speeds and
did not begin slowing
their vehicles until relatively close to the
crossing. Motorists
entering the approach with the added stimulus of
a train across, or
about to cross, the road (first obstructed vehicles)
slowed earlier
and decelerated more gradually. Motorists approaching
behind vehicles
which were already stopped ahead, entered even
more slowly. Thus,
earlier deceleration of approaching motorists appeared
to be a direct
function of the amount of added stimuli present. It
was hypothesized
that the generally-accepted, superior effectiveness
of automatic gates
was due to the added stimulus of the gates across
the highway, perhaps
simulating, to the approaching driver, a vehicle stopped
in the roadway.
Numerous tables and graphs showing the comparisons of
mean entry
speeds for all categories of southbound and northbound
vehicles and
plots of the speed profiles of each category on the
approaches are
presented in the Interim Report .
Deceleration Rates
An analysis of 3640 vehicle deceleration rates, seven
for each
vehicle, showed that only 20 of them, contributed by 13
vehicles, were
higher than the comfortable range. These higher rates
of deceleration
occurred in free flow cars, first unobstructed cars or
first obstructed
cars and all occurred between 700 and 230 feet of the
crossing. Two
probable causes are: 1) extremely high approach speed
or 2) not becoming
immediately aware of the existence of the crossing or
approaching train.
Whatever the cause, these 13 drivers formed the group of
drivers who
came close to being involved in a grade crossing accident.
A reduction in the number of such incidents may be
possible by
providing warning devices with more impact on drivers.
Also, reduction
in the number, or percentage, or such incidents may be an
important




The conclusions of Phase I are presented
below as they appear in
the Interim Report (29):
1 The photographic data collection
and reduction
process developed as a part of this
research was
relatively inexpensive and quickly
implemented
and was effective in determining speed
profiles
and rates of deceleration for .vehicles
approaching
a highway-railway grade crossing. It
should have
further application for similar studies
where




2 It appears that grade crossing accidents
involve
singularly inattentive or distracted
motorists,
based upon the fact that the groups of
drivers
in the several categories studied could
not be
distinguished by differences in deceleration
rates
between the categories.
3 Motorists approaching the grade crossing
in this
research reacted differently depending
upon the
prevailing conditions at the crossing.
Drivers
who entered the approach when the
signals were
activated without a train immediately present
d d
not begin slowing their vehicles until
relatively
close to the crossing. Motorists viewing
the
added stimulus of a train across the road,
or
close to the crossing, slowed their
vehicles
earlier, and decelerated more gradually.
Motorists approaching behind vehicles which
were
already stopped for a train entered even
more
slowly. Thus, each of these added
stimuli at
the crossing carried with it a corresponding
earlier and more gradual deceleration by the
affected motorists. This may explain why
auto-
matic crossing gates, which present a
stimulus
similar to that of a stopped vehicle, have
proved
to be the most effective type of standard
crossing
protection device.
4 Only 20 of the 3640 vehicle deceleration
rates
'
calculated in this study were higher than
the
comfortable range. Thirteen vehicles contributed
these 20 high rates. These vehicles were
from
the categories of free flow cars, first
unobstructed
cars or firs? obstructed cars. The
abnormal ranges
generally occurred between 700 to 230 feet
from the
crossing. It is probably that some of these
excessive rates were caused by the very high
approach
speeds of some of these vehicles, but it is
also
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possible that some of it was found that
actions of
groups of motorists in several categories
based
upon prevailing crossing conditions,
could not be
distinguished on the basis of deceleration
rates,
thus indicating that drivers involved
in grade
crossing accidents are singularly
inattentive or
distracted. It was also determined that
drivers
approach?' the crossing under progressively
greater
stimulus as to the hazard involved entered
the




CHAPTER 5: DRIVER REACTION TO A HIGH-SPEED
RURAL GRADE CROSSING
Data Collection Phase II
The automatic gates were installed at the Goldsmith
grade crossing
in April 1973. After a three-week period to allow
local drivers to
adjust to the new system, phase II. the "after" phase of the
research
project was begun. Care was taken to reproduce data collection
pro-
cedures and techniques that had been used during
phase I. The same
equipment was used.
Condition Differences Between Phases
In the second phase, with automatic gates that activated
at a
uniform time prior to the train's arrival, there would
be no category
of approach vehicles that fit the definition of "first
unobstructed"
of Phase I. It was not initially clear what other
differences in
approach vehicle categories there might be. With this
in mind notes
were taken with sufficient detail so that vehicle
approach conditions
would be clear when the film was reviewed. These notes
were printed
on sheets of paper with a felt pen and photographed
immediately after
an occurrence. Thus, after data reduction, grouping
could be analyzed.
The Marquardt train speed predictor which had been
installed with
the gates created one minor "problem" that was not present
during
Phase I. During Phase I, the signals were activated at
a given point
on the track regardless of train speed. It was possible
for the camera
operator to note this point, know exactly when the signal
would be
activated and know when to start looking for entering vehicles.
With
the Marquardt predictor, there was no such "point" since
train loca-
tion at activation depended on train speed. Therefore, the
operator
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had to pay dose attention to the signal itself
before picking up the
first entering vehicle.
The Marquardt system resulted in
possibly one variable that was not
preS ent in Phase I and whose affect
in Phase II can only be estimated.
That is, slow trains were relatively
close to the crossing before
signals were activated. Because of
the clear sight distances of
approxi-
mately h mile in three quadrants,
a motorist could see a slow tram
several seconds before the train
activated the signals. Whether a
motorist really did notice such a train,
and what affect it may have
had on his approach speed before
signal activation, could not be
positively determined.
Collection Time Period
Data collection progressed throughout
the summer of 1973. There
was no way to obtain a railroad
schedule that was accurate enough
to
be of value. The plan adopted was
to drive to the site early, set
up
and wait. On a few days during phase
II no trains approached during
the waiting period. On a few occasions
there were no vehicles which
approached the crossing when a train
crossed. As a result several
days were required to obtain adequate
data.
Weekends, including Fridays, were excluded
as not being typical.
The collection process extended from
mid-May until mid-August. It was
assumed that traffic characteristics
remained constant over this
period. Observations at the site gave
no evidence to the contrary.
Data Reduction
Vehicle Categories
After the film was developed it was run
through the same projector
used to reduce the phase I data to
frame counts, as described previously
The Interim Report defined two categories
of "first" vehicles,
namely, first unobstructed and first
obstructed. Both were first to
enter the system after signal activation
but no record was kept on how
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long after the signals started flashing that
this "first" car entered.
In the comparison of phase II data to phase I
data it was appropriate
to define a "first" car in the same manner, that
is without regard to
the time interval between signal activation and
the car's appearance.
However, it was felt that additional information
might be obtained if
the phase II data were broken down into smaller
groups that did consider
this time interval
.
The groupings were by subjective judgment of probable time
affects.
After several days of taking field data and studying
the films, it was
apparent that there were several possibilities for
classifications that
might be significantly different. These initial phase
II groups and
their comparisons are discussed below.
Group 1 . A motorist who entered the system at
approximately the
same time that the signals were activated and who
was the first to stop
at the crossing.
Group 2 . A motorist who entered the system 1-5
seconds after the
signals were activated and who was the first to stop at
the crossing.
Group 3 . A motorist who entered the system more
than 5 seconds
after the signals were activated and who was the first
to stop at the
crossing.
Group 4 . The second car to stop at the crossing
although it was
the first to enter the system after activation. The
train had not
reached the crossing when this vehicle stopped.
Group 5 . The second car to stop at the crossing
although it was
the first to enter the system after activation. The
train had reached
the crossing when the vehicle stopped.
Group 6 . The second car to enter the system after
signal activa-
tion. '
Group 7 . The third or greater vehicle to enter the
system after
signal activation.
Group 8 . A vehicle which entered the system after the
gates raised
after the train passed and which did not have to stop.
This car was picked up with the camera after following the
first




Group 9 . A vehicle that was in an
intermediate trap when the
signal activated and did not stop.
Group i_q. A vehicle that was in an intermediate
trap when the
signal activated and did stop.
Group U . A free flow vehicle.
All of the above, except Groups 8, 9 and 10,
are plotted in
Figure 10. The numerical values of mean speeds
at each trap can be
read from Tables 10 and 11.
It should be pointed out that Groups 8, 9,
and 10 were specialized
cases not related to the primary purpose of the
analysis and only a few
cases were recorded. It was decided to include
Groups 9 and 10 in the
analysis however, since they are a real part of
the total population
that are affected by automatic gates. They are
analyzed separately
in a later section. Due to the limited sample
of these cases, possible
limitations of any inferences must be kept in mind.
Comparisons were made of all possible pairs of the
phase II groups
of approaching cars. There were not enough
trucks in most groups to
make meaningful comparisons. Therefore, trucks
were included only in
the free-flow group.
Groups 1 through 5 were all "first cars to
enter the system after
signal activation." Since Group 1 entered immediately
after activation,
it could be called the ideal "first" group.
The other four were tested,
pairwise, for significant difference from Group 1.
Group 2 was significantly different from Group 1
at the a = 0.10
level in traps 4, 5 and 6, but there were no
differences between Groups
1 and 3 and there were no differences between
Groups 1 and 4 in any of
the traps. Group 5 was significantly different at
all traps (Table 10)
and plotted more closely with "following" Groups 6
and 7, the second
and third cars, respectively, to enter the system
after signal activation
(Figure 10). With the physical circumstances of a car
ahead (already
stopped or stopping) and a train across the road, it
was decided that
conditions were closer to those being associated with a
"following car."
Furthermore as shown by Table 11, Group 5 was not
significantly differ-
ent than either Groups 6 or 7 in any of the traps,
supporting the
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nto system just before signal activated and first to stop.
nto system 1-5 seconds after signal activated and
first to
nto system >5 seconds after signal activated and
first to
nto system after signal activated, second to stop
but train
not yet at crossing.
First into system after signal activated, second to
stop but after
train at crossing.
Second to enter the system after signal activation.
Third or greater vehicle to enter the system.
Free flow vehicles.
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decision to include it as a following car. No consideration was given
to not including Group 2 with the first cars because this would have
been inconsistent with the phase I data collection procedures. For
future studies of this type, the time (after activation) of entry
should be considered.
Because of the small sample sizes, no broad inferences can be
drawn from comparisons of the speed distributions of the four first
cars. However, it is interesting to note that Group 2 entered several
miles per hour slower even though it entered Trap 1 as much as five
seconds after signal activation. At 60 mph, this represents a travel
distance as much as 440 feet and is an indication that the signals have
an effect beyond the 1162-foot distance to Trap 1. This indication is
further supported by the fact that all groups entering after signal
activation entered slower than free-flow cars.
Groups 1 through 4 were subsequently analyzed together as one
group of "first obstructed - after" as shown in Figure 11. Groups 5
through 7 were subsequently analyzed together as one group of "following
- after" cars. A separate plot of these two larger groupings is shown
in Figure 13 and a summary of the mean speeds can be seen in Table 12.
The difference in speeds between "first" and "following" cars is
significant in all traps.
Integration of the Before Data
The speed data taken before the gates had been installed, the
"before" data, were recoded to conform to the coding of the "after"
data and incorporated with it into one data set. Thus, comparisons
within the before subset could be reproduced as well as any others
that might be of interest.
The primary methodology for comparison involved selected compari-
sons of speeds and decelerations of vehicles approaching the crossing.
Speeds, as stated earlier, were determined at each trap for all












FIGURE II • SPEED PROFILE OF ORIGINAL
CATEGORIES












































FIGURE 13 SPEED PROFILES OF FINAL
COMBINED
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Deceleration rates were determined between
each trap for all
vehicles by the formula:
Vf = V - /2dT
where: V f
= final velocity in feet per sec.
V = initial velocity in feet per sec.
d = deceleration rate in feet per sec.
per sec.
1 = distance in feet
Substituting the necessary conversion factors
and a value for 1




where: d = deceleration rate in feet
per sec. per sec.





= final velocity in miles per hour
Categories. Previously discussed were the
categories into which
Butcher had grouped the before data; namely,
free-flow, first unobstruc-
ted first obstructed and following cars
(29). By definition, a first
unobstructed car was one that entered and
approached the system,
passing through while the signals were
flashing but while the train
was far enough away to not put the driver
in any real danger. With the
gate system, the gates started down when
the signals were activated
Thus, a first car entering Trap 1, 1162
feet from the track had little
or no chance to beat the gate. The
gates were down approximately ten
seconds after activation of the system.
Assuming that they would be
low enough to be hit by a car roof in
eight seconds, a car would have
to travel approximately 99 mph (145 ft/sec)
to "beat the gate." Thus,
the assumption of the after study that
first drivers entering the speed
trap system after activation were obstructed
by the gate across the
road appears to be a reasonable one.
Another factor was the addition of a Marquardt
speed predictor.
The estimated train speed at the crossing
ranged from 20 to 60 mph
resulting, under the old system, that signals
started flashing an
estimated 60 to 90 seconds before the train was
at the crossing, ihus
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a first car into the old system had sufficient time to approach and
cross ahead of a train in the slower train speed range. The Marquardt
predictor gave a uniform 20 to 25 second warning. It is reasonable
to assume that only the most aggressive drivers entering trap 1 at
the time of signal activation would not perceive the train as being
close enough to be a hazard. Thus, even if there were no gates, the
Marquardt speed predictor itself would essentially have eliminated the
"first unobstructed" category of phase I.
It was concluded from the above considerations that it would be
appropriate to label the phase II, "first cars" entering the system
as "first obstructed - after" and to make statistical comparisons with
the before category of first obstructed vehicles. It is important to
note that automatic gates essentially eliminated driver decision,
except for those yery close to the crossing, relative to proceeding
across the crossing after the flashing lights had been activated.
This is where a driver may make the bad decision that no hazard exists
because of the approaching train when, in fact, it does.
Summary . The after data were composed of only two categories that
could be compared to the before data; namely "first obstructed - after"
and "following" cars. The case of the "first obstructed - after"
was defined differently than the before case, that is, in the before
case the train itself was the obstruction and in the after case the
gate arms were the obstruction.
Comparison of the Before and After Analysis
The Crossing Protection - Before
The crossing was protected by two sets of flashing light signals
and reflectorized crossbucks. There was an additional set of flashing
lights aimed down each approach of County Road 100 S. Times of signal
activation before the train reached the crossing varied greatly with
times up to 90 seconds observed for some particularly slow moving
trains. The signals were an "older" type with 8 inch diameter lens.
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Standard advance warning signs were placed in pairs, one on each
side of the road of each approach, at a distance of 1000 feet from the
tracks. As a temporary counter-measure to public pressure to improve
protection at the crossing, one yellow flasher of the construction
barricade type had been attached to each advance warning sign. They
were small and dim and flashed continuously. These remained in place
throughout the collection of phase I data. There was no reasonable
way to measure their effect.
Standard pavement markings were painted across both lanes of each
approach. All signs, signals, and markings were well maintained and in
good order.
The Crossing Protection - After
The upgraded Goldsmith protection system consisted primarily of
automatic gates with full width gate-arms. The gates across the
southbound lanes were designed and placed to block three lanes, that
is, the two existing lanes plus a future left-turn lane to the county
road planned by the State Highway Commission. These were supplemented
by several pairs of flashing lights. On the southbound approach
(because of the greater pavement width) there was one pair on each
side of the roadway as well as one pair over each lane on a tubular,
cantilever structure. On the northbound approach there were only two
pair, one over each roadway. In addition there was one pair of
flashing lights aimed toward each approach of C. R. 100 S. All flashers
are larger (12-inch lenses) and brighter than the ones that had been in
place originally.
The gate arms have the standard, lantern-type red lights on each
arm. In addition, six strobe lights were installed on each arm. The
strobe lights have red lenses aimed toward each approach and are
activated concurrently with the standard flashers. Each strobe light
flashes independently of all others.
New reflectorized advance warning signs were placed on each
approach, in place of the original ones. No yellow flasher was used
with the new signs. Standard pavement markings were in place as before.
88
This active syste., gates, flashers,
a™ lanterns and strobes, are
all activated by a Harguardt
speed predictor. The Marouar t
sys „
calculates" the train's speed ahd
activates the signals such that
all
trains are 25 seconds away fro™
the crossing regardless . speed
schematic view of the crossing has
heen shown previo 1 «
and a series of photographic
views is shown in Figures 14
through 17.
After the phase I (before) data
were receded it was analyzed
with
the after data as a complete
set. All the raw before data
were rerun
because the Purdue Computer center
had changed its primary statistical
IZI fl the BH series to SPSS (Statistical Parage
for the Social
Sciences) programs in the interim
between the two phases.
Preliminary Considerations
The first concern was to determine
insofar as possible, if the
after data were reasonably
consistent with the before data.
It is
nable to assume that the free-flow
data should be the most s ah ,
before and after, because of the
relatively large number of
observations
1 as the fact that the free-flow
entry speeds (trap fl were no
expected to be affected by the
crossing improvement to any
significant
degree because of the distance
from the crossing (>1000 feet).
TABLE 13. NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS



























(B) BEFORE IMPROVEMENT (29)
tuf rm rKMTTH GRADE CROSSING AS VIEWED FROM THE NORTHBOUND





(B) BEFORE IMPROVEMENT (29)
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(A) AFTER IMPROVEMENT
(B) BEFORE IMPROVEMENT (29)
FIGURE 17. THE GOLDSMITH GRADE CROSSING
AS VIEWED FROM 100S LOOKING
WEST PARALLEL TO TRACKS
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The mean entry speeds and tests
of differences between mean entry
speeds for various categories of
southbound and northbound cars for
both
phase I and phase II are shown in
Table 14 and Tabie 15 respectively
The entry speeds, standard
deviations, and statistic,! test results
of
the before data analysis are as
reported in the MerimJeEort (29,
"'
"Ihe mean entry speeds of all categories
of free-flow cars appear
to be of the same magnitude and,
with one exception, have the same
standard deviation. That exception
is the relatively low standard
deviation of southbound, free-flow
trucks. An F-test of the variance
showed that the difference is
significant. Since all other categories
have no significant differences
between before and after comparisons
of variance, it is unlikely that this
difference is due to differences
in before and after data collection
techniques. The histogram
delineating the southbound, free-flow
truck speed distribute,
Figure 18, indicates the possibility
of bias in the after group toward
the 45-50 mph group. The distribution
of the before data is obviously
more normal and less suspect of bias;
however, neither the data nor
observation during the summer gave any
indication of what the cause
might be It was noted throughout the
summer, however, that many
trucks braked and slowed noticeably,
apparently for crossing roughness.
One possibility is that the after
group of truck drivers were more
aware of the crossing ahead because
of the gate arms and were entering
slower due to anticipated roughness
ahead.
One result from the phase I data
was that the mean entry speeds
of northbound and southbound free-flow
cars were significantly defer-
ent That analysis also found that
the mean entry speeds of northbound
and southbound free-flow trucks were
significantly different. A
summary of the statistical tests from
that analysis is shown ,n Table
14 This result was explained by Butcher
as follows (29):
This phenomenon may possibly be
attributed to a com-
bination of two situations Peculiar to the
northbound
approach First, all northbound vehicles
had ust
sed hrough the signal controlled
Intersection of
U S. 31 and S. R. 28 approximate y
one mile south of
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vehicles, especially trucks, may not have
leveled off
before reaching the crossing. Second, sight
distance
to the east is restricted for northbound
vehicles, as
a^scussed earlier, so a bit more caution may
have been
exercised by these drivers.
A similar analysis was made with the
phase II data and the results
were different than those of phase I.
Although analysis of the after
data showed that the values of mean entry
speeds of both southbound
free-flow cars and trucks were slightly higher
than their respective
northbound values, the differences were not
significant in either case,
as can be seen in Tables 15 and 16.
There are several possible reasons for the
above differences.
First the writer tends to doubt that the signal
per se, one mile to
the south, has much affect. This writer
is inclined to attribute the
difference to driver expectancy. A northbound
driver in the two or
three miles prior to the crossing passes not
only the traffic light
but several houses, roadside businesses and
a major at-grade inter-
section. Just prior to the crossing there is
a County Road. The
southbound driver has had a level, straight,
wide-open, "freeway-type"
facility for at least 10 miles. A driver is
easily lulled into what
may be called a "freeway feeling" and a false
sense of security, and
does not expect cross obstructions such as a
railroad crossing at grade,
The differences in sight distance could be a
factor. The south-
bound driver has no sight restriction to either
side along the tracks,
whereas the northbound driver has a restricted
sight distance to the
west. Also, the old signals, being close to
the ground, were not
visible against the horizon before protection
improvement.
Under phase II conditions, the gates in the "up"
position are
visible against the horizon. One is now more
aware "something" is
ahead even if not initially recognizing it as a
grade crossing.
Method of Comparison
The primary method of analyzing data within the
phase I subset
had been by comparing entry speeds, approach speed
profiles and
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phase II data. First the phase
I summary data reported speed at
each
trap and speed at each trap as a
percentage of entry speed. No rea
use was made of the percentages,
however, nor was any value apparen
in ana!yzlng before and after
differences. Therefore, these are not
Included herein. In their place,
deceleration rates were calcul
and recorded along with all
appropriate speed data. Thus, for all
>ean values at speed-trap locations"
reported, all correspond, ng
between trap mean decelerations are
Included.
The second refinement was that a
t-test of the means was per-
formed on a trap by trap basis.
That is, the only tests that were
run
„„ phase I data were to determine
significance between entry speeds;
hut on the Phase II data a test
was performed for significant
d,ffer-
ences in mean speeds at each of
the eight traps as well as each
of the
seven deceleration zones between traps.
'
Mean deceleration rates are of such
a low magnitude that they are
relatively meaningless parameters.
Their analysis in a later section
discusses this point. However, showing
the deceleration rates ,n the
tables does make trends in the speed
profile more clear.
Free-Flow Speed Profile Comparisons
The primary purpose of this study
was concerned with determining
the effect of activation of the new
signal system on drivers. Th,s
effect will be discussed in the next
section. A brief comparison of
the free-flow data and its analysis
follows.
The results of the analysis of
free-flow vehicles are presented
in Table 17 and Figures 19 and 20.
Two points are obvious from the
plots of the approach speeds of all
classes of vehicles. F,rst, there
is a decrease in after speed, relative
to before speed, at all traps
along each profile except that the
entry (Trap 1) speed for northbound
cars was about the same. Secondly,
before and after speed profiles
for their respective groups are
essentially parallel. These two
factors indicate that motorist responses
to both the old and new
system were similar but at slightly
reduced speed throughout their
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speed profiles showed slightly higher speeds in all categories of
southbound vehicles both before and after.
On the northbound approach, comparing before and after, the entry
speeds of cars were the same but the after profile showed initial
deceleration at a greater rate between Trap 1 and Trap 2. Trucks,
after, entered slower on both approaches as did cars, after, on the
southbound approach. The implication is that the average driver was
more aware of the crossing during phase II, even at the entry point,
particularly on the southbound approach.
Another observation that can be made, particularly from Figures
19 and 20, is the point that the motorist begins decelerating for the
crossing. On the southbound approach, cars and trucks, before and
after, all start their deceleration, albeit slight, at Trap 4 (Figure
19) or about 700 feet from the crossing. The implication is that this
point is independent of both vehicle and protection type. On the
northbound approach (excluding the initial deceleration of after cars
at the entry point) cars and trucks, before and after, all start their
deceleration at Trap 5 or 6 or approximately 400 to 500 feet from the
crossing.
Sanders concluded that (3, p. 508): "The resulting (speed) profiles
showed that the crossing does not influence traffic behavior beyond 500
feet." This study does not support this conclusion. Entry speeds indi-
cate some effect at more than 1000 feet and on the southbound approach,
there is noticeable deceleration at 700 feet.
The grade crossings of Sanders' study were in urban or suburban
environments. The northbound approach at the Goldsmith grade crossing
could be categorized as being suburban in nature; whereas the south-
bound approach is strictly rural. The implication is that on high-
speed, rural grade crossing approaches drivers take action sooner.
Free-Flow Deceleration Rates
The mean deceleration rates, particularly for the free-flow cate-
gories, were used only as an aid in analyzing trends in the speed
profile. However, one driver characteristic can be noted. Drivers
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did not decelerate at a constant
rate from pent of ,mti.1 act,- to
desired slower speed at or near
the crossing. A driver was more
litaly
to decelerate early, maintain
lower speed or accelerate again „
some
cases, then decelerate again closer
to the crossing. This pattern
,.
evident from the nonuniformity of the
speed profiles as can be seen
Figures 19 and 20 and the variations
in the actual rates that can be
noted in Table 17. This characteristic
is consistent with findings
by Sanders on several suburban
crossings (3, p. 7-4):
the population tends to brake for
short periods
during the approach such that the
measured maximum
deceleration resulted in the major proportion
of
tne total speed decrease rather than
making a
smaller braking effort for a longer
period of time
In other words, a driver's deceleration
rate was variable during
his approach to a grade crossing.
However, Sanders found that the
point of maximum deceleration was
generally about 45 feet from the
crossing, indicating that drivers
waited as long as possible before
braking, the data from the Goldsmith
crossing study indicate maximum
braking prior to Trap 7, greater than
200 feet from the crossing
This
could be another significant difference
between rural and suburban
(or urban) grade crossings. It also
indicates that drivers on a high
speed rural approach will react early
if alerted early.
Free-Flow Speed Distributions
In addition to analyzing mean speeds
and mean speed profiles, the
distribution of speeds was examined.
First, this was done in order to
determine if the pace speed had changed
from phase I, and ^ make com-
parisons of the before and after data set
of above-pace-speed vehicles.
Appendix A contains a series of speed
distribution charts Al through
A12 These relative and cumulative
speed distribution curves are for
selected distributions at Trap 1 (entry
speed), Trap 5 (mid-point) and
Trap 8.
The frequency distribution curve,
Figure A2, shows that the
phase I pace speed is 62.5 to 72.5 mph.
The phase II pace speed is
61 5 to 71.5 mph. From a practical
standpoint, one could say that the
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before and after pace speeds were both 62 to 72 mph. Within the limits
of accuracy of the data and the accuracy of plotting Figure A2 it was
concluded that the pace speed did not change significantly.
On the other hand, the distribution of speeds has shifted toward
the "slow side," i.e., a higher percentage of vehicles is traveling
at lower speeds. This fact is more easily seen in the before and after
southbound cumulative speed curves, Figure A3. It can be seen in the
frequency distribution curve of entry speeds, Figure A3, that 18% of
the vehicles were traveling above the pace speed after system improve-
ment whereas 28% were traveling above pace speed before system
improvement. Likewise, whereas the range of entry speeds before was
45 to 90 mph, the range of speeds after was 40 to 80 mph. Also, from
the cumulative speed curve, Figure A3, the 85th percentile speed was
lowered from 74 to 71 mph at the entry trap.
Although data were not plotted for all speed traps, the data showed
similar results at all traps, both southbound and northbound. An
"average speed distribution" was calculated by taking the mean of all
eight traps for a given speed group. The cumulative speed distribution
curves for both southbound and northbound approaches, based on these
averages are shown in Figures 21 and 22. It can be concluded that the
above analysis of the speed data, corresponds with the statistical
analysis of the mean values at speed trap locations, i.e., shift toward
lower approach speeds because of the gate arms.
Above Pace, Free-Flow Speed Comparisons
The calculated pace speed was 62.5-72.5 mph before and 61.5 to
71.5 after, as determined from the frequency distribution curve of
Figure A2. It was decided that 62- 72 mph would be close enough for
both before and after southbound data as well as before and after
northbound data. The cumulative speed curve of entering northbound
and southbound free-flow cars, Figures 21 and 22, show that this is
not an unreasonable assumption.
It should be noted that in the Interim Report (29), Butcher
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FIGURE 21- CUMULATIVE SPEED DISTRIBUTION CURVE
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The reason foe this difference
could oot be deterged. The purpose
of the above pace analysis was
to analyze the affect of some
any)
group of "fastest" cars. Since
72 mph is approximately the 85 h
percentile, it seeded to be a reasonab!e
"break point," to analyze
the northbound/southbound, before/after
differences of those cars
faster thah 72 mph. In fact, it
seemed more reasonable to use
.given
speed as a fixed break point because
it had already been shown that for
any fixed percentile the after
speeds were lower than the before
speeds.
_
The summary of above-pace results
is shown in Figures 23 and 24
and Tables 18 and 19. It is
doubtful that any broad inferences
can be
drawn from these results but a
couple points are of interest.
In
regard to southbound vehicles, the
mean speed profile of these groups
is almost identical, but the
percentage of cars entering 72 mph
after
improvement was reduced from 23.67.
to 13.6%. This reinforces the
implication of greater or earlier
awareness of the crossmg ,. the
after situation. . noc
The northbound before and after
groups had almost equal percentages
entering >72 mph, 17.4% vs 17.2%, but
the mean speed profile of the
after groups was significantly lower
in five traps. This lowering
indicates a speed reduction of the
"fastest" cars.
The fact that a lessor percentage
of southbound drivers was
traveling greater than 72 after is
possibly an indication that they
were more aware that there was a
grade crossing ahead before entering
Trap 1 This cannot be substantiated
by other parameters, but it does
suggest that research on high speed
approaches should have speed traps
at distances greater than 1162 feet.
In regard to the significant
differences between the before and
after northbound, mean-speed profile,
this could be an indication that
at the Trap 1 location the "speeding"
driver (>10 mph above posted
speed) became more aware of a crossing
ahead, realized that his sight
distance was restricted-both directions
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FIGURE 23= SPEED LOCATION GRAPH FOR ABOVE PACEZ
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Individual Free-Flow Fastest Vehicles
The individual vehicle speeds comprising
the various subsets of
northbound and southbound free-flow vehicles
entering at >72 rnph that
make up the means of the groups in Tables 13
and 19 are shown in
Tables 20 through 23.
It is of interest to note that these
"fastest" drivers are of
three distinct types, not apparent when
looking only at group means.
There are those who decelerate immediately
between Trap 1 and Trap 2,
there are those who maintain a constant speed
until somewhere between
Trap 5 and Trap 7 then slow, and finally there
are those drivers that
maintain a constant speed all the way through the
system. Their
inconsistencies stand out more than any discernible
trend.
Speed Comparisons with Si gnals Activated
"First" Vehicles
Although there are indications that the unactivated
gate arms
against the horizon made the presence of a
crossing ahead more apparent
to approaching motorists than for the before
condition, perhaps of
more importance is the impact after entry of a
train into the system.
In phase I, Butcher categorized the vehicles
into first unobstruc-
ted, first obstructed, and following (29). As
defined earlier, first
unobstructed vehicles were first to enter the system
after signal
activation but did not stop at the crossing because
they did not
consider the train to be close enough to be a hazard.
First obstructed
vehicles were the first to enter the system after
signal activation
and they stopped at the crossing because either
the train was across
the road or near enough that the driver perceived
a danger or an
obstruction. Following cars were vehicles that
entered the system with
the signals activated, train across the road and
at least one car
already stopped ahead at the crossing. To generalize,
each successive




TABLE 20. NORTHBOUND FREE-FLOW CARS,












75.0 75.0 75.0 75.0
75.0 75.0 76.9 76.9
75.0 75.0 75.0 75.0
73.2 73.2 70.9 73.2
73.2 75.0 81.8 81.8
73.2 70.9 69.2 67.7
73.2 73.2 73.2 73.2
73.2 75.0 76.9 79.6
Max
Decel-
TMnjn Tran#2 Trap #3 Trap #4 Trap #5 Trap #6 Trap #7 Trap #8
Speed Speed Speed Speed Speed Speed
Speed eration
79.6 79.6 79.6 79.6 79.6 9.7
84.1 87.4 87.4 84.1 84.1 3.9
79.6 79.6 75.0 73.2 69.2
4.5
81.8 81.8 81.8 79.6 79.6 2.4
79.6 81.8 81.8 81.8 81.8 0.0
79.6 76.9 76.9 75.0 73.2 2.9
73.2 70.9 67.7 57.3 55.2 8.9
79.6 76.9 76.9 76.9 75.0 2.9
75.0 75.0 76.9 76.9 76.9 0.0
75 75.0 75.0 75.0 73.2 73.2
67.7 65.7 5.3
75 75.0 75.0 75.0 73.2 75.0
70.9 67.7 4.2
79.6 79.6 79.6 76.9 76.9
2.9
76.9 76.9 76.9 76.9 0.0
76.9 76.9 76.9 76.9 0.0
75.0 75.0 75.0 75.0 0.0
73.2 73.2 70.9 70.9 2.3
76.9 76.9 65.7 62.9 11.1
67.7 64.3 60.0 56.2 3.7
73.2 73.2 75.0 75.0 0.0
79.6 79.6 79.6 76.9 2.9
73*2 732 73.2 73.2 73.2 70.9 70.9 69.2
2.3
73 2 73.2 73.2 73.2 73.2
73.2 69.2 65.7 3.9
75.0 73.2 73.2 73.2 1.9
75.0 73.2 73.2 75.0 1.9
73.2 75.0 75.0 75.0
73.2 73.2 73.2 75.0
Notes: 1. All values of speed - miles/hour






















^j- o r-- r-- o










o o en o
ro ro ro oo












o o r-~ o






































































C71 IX) CM cn LX) CO IX) LD





CTi IX) IX) IX) IX) IX) cn

















































































































TABLE 22. SOUTHBOUND FREE-FLOW
CARS, BEFORE, ENTERING AT A SPEED
>72 MPH
Maximum
WW T^^WW Ttf-W «
87 4 87.4 87.4 87.4 84.1
87.4 84.1 84.1 3.9
81.8 81.8 81.8 81.8
81 8 81.8 81.8 81.8
81 8 81.8 81.8 81.8
alia 81.8 79.6 84.1 81.8 .„-
~-
fi ^ ^11 11 11 I I I I I1 1 III S': SI SI 3:! «.« ™ «81 8
79.6 79.6 81.8 79.6
76.9 75.0 76.9
kM JS3 Jl:? 7 5 : 75.0 73.2
79*6 76^ 75 75.0 75
2.9
796 76.9 75.0 75.0 73.2 73.2 73.2
73.2 2.9
II « S II 11 i « II \\
79*.6 79.6 81.8 81.8 2.4
75 75.0 76.9 76.9 2.0
»* 7" 76 - 9 S:S ?S:S &S ^ J!:S j:8
79
'.6 79.6 79.6 81.8
76.9 76.9 76.9 76.9
S Si as II IsM K £i S:!. »» »° '« ™ : ° h
750 75.0 76.9 76'.9 73^ 75.0 73.2 73.2
3.9
73.2 73.2 73.2 75.0 73.2 32 75 73
2 19
?!:i g:S &§ III Hi ™ »:§ « : ° ?•?
™'5 71 2 70 9 73'2 73^2 70.9 73.2 73.2 2.3
1
'
: 7S0 76.9 75.0 69.2 67
5.7
"J k2 75.0 76.9 76.9 75.0 76.9 76.9 2.0
li Si! If:! g':i B:i B:S Si Si S
Note- 1. All values of speed = miles/hour
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Two characteristics of the improved
system eliminated the "first-
unobstructed" group. The improved
crossing is always obstructed prior
to arrival of a train, after
activation of the signal, by the gate
arm.
Thus, there is no after group that
was first unobstructed. The "first
obstructed - before" (by train) group was
compared to the "first
obstructed - after" (by gate arm) group.
The mean speed profile values at the
speed-trap locations for
"first cars" are shown in Tables 24 and
25 and plotted in Figures 25
and 26 It can be seen in both
figures that the first unobstructea
group enters at approximately free-flow
speed and decelerates rapidly,
but not especially drastically, to
between 25 to 40 mph, then appears
to make the decision that it is safe
to cross the tracks ahead of the
approaching train. The result of a bad
decision here will result in an
accident statistic or a "near miss."
Automatic gates take the option
to cross or not to cross away from
all drivers except those very close
to the crossing. Taking the option away
from the driver eliminates
the possibility of a bad decision and,
therefore, this particular
type of accident statistic.
There are differences in the northbound
and southbound "first un-
obstructed - before" speed profiles. On the
southbound approach,
drivers slowed to about 40 mph at Trap 7,
then appeared to make the
decision to cross the tracks. Sight distance
on this approach is
unobstructed in both directions. On the
northbound approach the
profile followed practically the same speed
pattern up to Trap 7.
However, probably due to the restricted sight
distance, the northbound,
first unobstructed motorist continued to
decelerate after Trap 7 to
around 27 mph at Trap 8, delaying the decision
to cross.
In regard to comparisons related
specifically to the effect of
the gates, the southbound approach will be
considered first. Referring
to Figure 25 and Table 24 it can be seen
that the "first obstructed
-
after" (by gate) plots almost identically to
the "first obstructed
-
before" (by train). The t-tests of the means
show no significant
difference at any trap. This would indicate
that the gates were as
effective a barrier to the motorist as a train
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very near the crossing: Also,
note that the entry speeds are
both
gMficantly !ower than free-flow car
entry speed. The sower entry
SDeeds indicate that on this
approach with its unrestricted sight
Stance, * signals and/or train possibly had an
affect on approach,,
drivers farther fro™ the crossing
than the first trap Oil62.5 feet)
One aspect of the new syste™
cannot adeguately be evaluated
w,h
the data obtained. With the
Marquardt speed predictor activate the
signals a unifor™ 20-25 seconds
before the train reached the cross,ng
the train was at ti.es visible to
an alert southbound .otonst
several
seconds before the signals were
activated and while the dnver was ,11
several hundred feet fro™ the crossing.
There was no way to separa
fro™ the data which, if any, of
the drivers saw a train be ore
s,gnal
activation and which ones were
™otivated b, the signals only
0„ the northbound approach,
statistical analysis and plots
first obstructed - before" vs. "first
obstructed - after" are quite
different. The "first obstructed
- after" ™ore closely follows the
"first unobstructed - before."
Although the ™ean speed of the
after
gr„up is less than 'first unobstructed
- before" at all traps, the
difference is not statistically
significant until the fifth trap,
fro! that point (542.4 feet,, the
difference is significant as ™otor,sts
decelerate rapidly to a stop in the
after situation.
Even though the affect of gates
on the northbound approach oes
not
appear to be as analogous to train
presence (first obstructed - before)
as it does on the southbound
approach, a co™parison of the group
™ean
values of southbound and northbound
"first obstructed - after shows
that fro™ the 5th through 8th traps
they are about the same. Other
data indicate that free-flow vehicles
on the northbound approach appear
to delay their reaction to the
crossing until reaching the v,c,n,t»
of
Trap 5, for reasons that ™ay not
be a function of protection type
The relatively large difference of
higher entry speeds of first
obstructed - after" vs. "first obstructed
- before" does not necessanly
negate the hypothesis that gates have
a si™ilar obstructing effect es
a train across the road. In the
case of the northbound approach
the
lower "first obstructed
- before" ™ean speeds could be due
to the
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existence of some unusually slow
vehicles in the small sample, possibly
due to drivers seeing the train and
signals and slowing prior to Trap
Some indication of this point may
be observed from the Inten^SSll
data (Ref. 29, Figure 22, p. 99 and
Figure 26, p. 108) which show that
the range of speeds for southbound,
first obstructed cars is 47-30 mph
while the range for northbound, first
obstructed car speeds is 28-32
mph. These southbound and northbound
distributions are shown in
Figures 27 and 28, respectively.
Following Vehicles
Data on following vehicles,
northbound/southbound, before/after
were also analyzed. As can be noted
by examination of Tables 24 and
and observed in Figure 29 the data
show no meaningful differences due
to the improved signal system in
either direction of approach The
obvious conclusion is that following
vehicles are primarily affected
by other vehicles stopped ahead.
Fastest Vehicles After Signal Activation
Previously, an analysis of free-flow
vehicles above the pace
(above 72 mph) was made by looking at the
group means as well as a
listing of the vehicles making up these
groups. The fastest cars
entering the system under other than
free-flow conditions were also
studied. ,. . oH
On the northbound approach the
fastest entering cars are listed
in Tables 26 and 27 for before and
after data respectively. On the
southbound approach the fastest entering
cars are listed in Tables
and 29 for before and after data
respectively.
After signal improvements, the fastest
of the southbound cars were
slower than the fastest northbound cars
even though the free-flow
southbound group mean was faster. This
adds support to the hypothesis
that the southbound motorist becomes
aware of the signal or tram prior
to entry into the system although the
data do not show this effect on
the northbound motorist. Groups 1 and
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Trap 1 at signal activation. Any prior
slowing would not have been
from the signals but could have been
from sighting a train. On the
northbound approach at Trap 1, it was
impossible to see an eastbound
train before it activated the signal
and very unlikely that a westbound
train would be seen. The implication is
that sighting of a tram along
with signal activation, leaving no doubt
regarding signal credibility,
had the greatest effect on the group
of "fastest" cars.
Table 30 shows the percentage of cars
of each sample which entered
the before and after systems above 60
mph. The percentage reduction of
these "high" speeds appears to be
significant. The summary table shows
clearly that in all categories of both
southbound and northbound cars,
the percentage of high-speed cars shows
reductions in all northbound
cases >75 mph and all southbound cases
>65 mph. The reduction in the
percentage of cars traveling >65 mph was
greater on the southbound
approach than on the northbound approach
for both conditions, "free-
flow" and "signals activated." Possible
reasons for this are as follows.
These speeds are at entry and it has
been previously noted that
slowing down occurs closer to the track on
the northbound approach than
on the southbound approach, and it should
be kept in mind that these
entry speeds are 1165 feet from the
crossing.
Secondly, with the Marquardt speed predictor,
the train would
generally be visible to southbound motorists
at the time of or soon
after signal activation, thus, there is no
doubt regarding the credibility
of the warning. In the "before" cases
where there were warnings up to 90
seconds before the train's arrival this was
not always the case.
One innovation was added to this particular
automatic gate installa-
tion Strobe lights, described previously,
had been added to each gate
arm By constant observation during an entire
summer and by conversa-
tions with visitors to the site, the strobe
lights were probably the
m0st impressive signal feature of the new
system. These high-intensity
flashing lights were visible several thousand
feet from the crossing.
Even though a driver may not know what was
ahead, he was alerted to the
flashes.
The strobe lights should be equally visible
to northbound and
southbound motorists and; therefore, should be
equally effective.
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BEFORE AFTER BEFORE AFTER
% > 60 MPH 26 42 50 68
% > 65 MPH 26 12 23 49
% > 72 MPH 12 12 18 16
% > 75 MPH 8 5
% > 80 MPH 2 2




BEFORE AFTER BEFORE AFTER
% > 60 MPH 19 31 92 75
% > 65 MPH 19 73 59
% > 72 MPH 7 26 14
% > 75 MPH 2 10 5
% > 80 MPH 2 3 3
% > 85 MPH
Note:
1. Percentage to nearest whole number
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However, the southbound approach
differs from the northbound approach
as previously discussed, i.e., because
of its more open, "freeway type
approach and drivers less expectant of
obstructions, the reaction to
them would be more noticeable when
comparing before and after conditions.
In other words, because of higher
driver expectancy, northbound drivers
had been more aware of the old signals
than southbound drivers. Thus,
the change after signal improvement
could have had more effect on the
southbound driver.
The reduction in southbound free-flow
vehicle speeds prior to
entry obviously could not be from the
strobe lights. However, by
personal observation, the gate arms themselves,
hanging in the air
against the horizon, make a southbound
motorist more aware that
"something" is ahead even if not recognized as
a grade crossing. Some
drivers slow down for grade crossings because
of expected roughness
even if they have no concern for a
train. Drivers also tend to slow
for unrecognizable "somethings" ahead.
Other aspects of the improved visibility
of the grade crossing
warning system after improvement, are
discussed in a later section which
contains a detailed discussion of visual
conditions and their effect on
drivers.
The Effect of Train Direction
Visibility down the tracks is good in both
directions on the south-
bound approach. On the northbound approach
there is a severe sight
restriction to the west making it impossible to
see an eastbound train
clearly until the train is approximately 200
feet from the highway.
A westbound train, on the other hand, is
visible to a northbound driver
at least one half mile from the crossing
while the driver is still
about 800 feet from the tracks.
The after data were coded so that train
direction could be analyzed
as one of the variables. This was not done
with the before data, thus
no before and after comparisons could be made.
Splitting the already
small first-obstructed car sample by train
direction, however, resulted
in samples too small for making broad inferences.
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It can be seen in Table 31 that a
one-tailed t-test of mean
approach speeds does not show any
significant differences. However
the small sample sizes need very
large differences to be statistically
significant.
A plot of the data for both the
northbound and southbound approaches
is shown in Figures 30 and 31. Note
that on the southbound approach
where the train is visible from both
directions, the plot of mean
approach speeds data is almost identical
for the two train directions
However, on the northbound approach a
plot of mean approach speeds shows
that when the train is eastbound and
cannot be seen by the motorists,
their speeds are several mph slower between
Trap 2 and Trap 6. Intui-
tively, it seems that such slower speed
is contrary to what one would
expect. That is, visibility of the train
plus gates should have more
effect on slowing a driver than just gates. In
any event, on either
approach, there is no evidence that gates
alone are any less effective
than when the train itself is visible.
Analysis of Deceleration Rates
Brief Review of Phase I
From the phase I data seven deceleration
rates, one between each
trap, were calculated for each of the 520
observed vehicles by the equa-
tion previously derived. The 3640
deceleration rates (520 vehicles *
7 locations between traps) were placed into
the classifications 1
through 5 as previously discussed.
Only 20 deceleration rates from 13
vehicles were above classifica-
tion 1, as shown in Table 32.
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Many, if not all, of the motorists in the "undesirable" classifica-
tion (2), with limits 8 through 11 feet/sec/sec may have decelerated
at this rate normally. The Traffic Engineering Handbook describes it
as, "undesirable but not alarming to passengers." If one assumes that
deceleration rates in groups three and four resulted because these
motorists did not become aware of the train until late in their approach,
and this is not necessarily so, the rate of such motorists might be a
measure of the effectiveness of warning systems.
Analysis of the phase II data showed that there were only nine
deceleration rates from eight vehicles out of 1827 rates (261 vehicles
x 7 locations) that were above classification 1. Tables 33 and 34 show
the vehicle deceleration patterns for those vehicles which had a
deceleration rate greater than class 1 for the before and after studies
respectively.
Table 35 is a summary of the high deceleration rates after the
improvement.





It can be seen that there were no rates above the undesirable range
after system improvement. The extremely small number of such high
deceleration rates, however, did not permit their use as a measure of
system effectiveness in this study. A much larger sample of before and
after motorists would have been necessary to provide any conclusive
evidence.
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Factors Affecting Visual Acuity
The Voorhees Report (13, Appendix B) contains a very comprehensive
review of human factors research. Several findings from this human
factors literature will be presented in this section and related to
visual conditions at the Goldsmith grade crossing (13).
It appears on first examination of the Goldsmith grade crossing
site that the only sight restriction is in the southwest quadrant and
that sight distance, particularly for a southbound motorist, is excel-
lent. However, the accident history shows that most of the fatal
accidents involved southbound drivers. The visibility of trains on
the southbound approach, in reality, only appears to be good, as the
lack of contrast between dark trains and the dark background might well
cause a motorist to not see the train. This condition probably is
present at many other grade crossings to some degree and should be
given more attention.
One factor in a driver's visual environment that must be considered
is that a driver's reactions are dependent not only on his basic visual
capabilities but also on the degree to which they are utilized at any
given time (13, p. 83). Thus, no matter what the level of a driver's
visual acuity, there are times he is not using it up to his capabilities.
A person's ability to differentiate colors is interrelated with
the brightness variable and lessens as illumination decreases (13, p. 84)
The greater the contrast an object has with its background the more
legible the object (13, p. 84). Low illumination levels decrease the
visual powers of acuity, contrast, form perception, depth perception,
and the ability to judge size, motion and position (13, p. 84).
There are conditions where the natural background is very important
to signs and signals. An example would be at dusk when the sky is still
bright but road-level objects merge with a dark, shadowy background, and
sky brightness provides enough glare to prevent the retina from adapting
to road-level conditions (13, p. 84).
Conditions at the Goldsmith grade crossing, particularly in regard
to the southbound approach, can be exactly as described above. The area
is flat and open, the highway is level and a driver looking ahead at the
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horizon sees the sky "coming down to the road." There are times when
the sky presents a very bright background. At road level, there is a
heavy tree line to the west parallel to the track and coming almost up
to it. This tree line presents a dark background. To the east there
is also a dark background, although not as pronounced. Many of the
trains that use the crossing are black and tend to blend into the dark
background.
Photographs were taken of a train against the background to the
west on a bright, summer afternoon with a 35 mm electric eye camera.
Two views are shown in Figures 32 and 33. These pictures were taken
under identical conditions 5-10 seconds apart. It was a hot, bright
summer day with cumulus clouds (which can be seen in the figures)
casting intermittent shadows over the various areas. The sun was just
"breaking out" of cloud cover at the time the pictures were taken.
The writer had an experience in regard to observation of a train
against this same background on a similar day that is noteworthy in
emphasizing the effect of this background and verifying that the camera
does not exaggerate its affect. A short train (8-10 all black cars)
was approaching from the west. The writer was looking down the highway
to the north into a bright horizon and did not realize a train was
approaching until it was in about the same location as the train in
Figures 32 and 33. The writer turned quickly upon hearing a train
whistle but for a full 3-5 seconds could not see the train although
it could be heard. The eyes finally made the proper adjustment and it
"became visible."
The affects of age would worsen the above condition as most
visual functions deteriorate markedly in older age. Of particular
importance are acuity, sensitivity to glare, and vision under low levels
of illumination (13, p. 85). Sanders (3, p. 3-28) gives some examples
of the effect of age on several aspects of vision, as follows: 1) by
age 60 visual acuity drops about 20 percent, 2) capability for dark
adaptation is sharply reduced, requiring about double the illumination
for every 13 years of age, 3) ability to see against glare is reduced
with age to the extent that it takes 50 to 70 times increased brightness
for a 75-85 year old to see against brightness as compared to a 15-year-
old.
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FIGURE 32. FRONT OF TRAIN AGAINST DARK BACKGROUND IMMEDIATELY WEST OF
THE GOLDSMITH GRADE CROSSING
FIGURE 33. MID-SECTION OF SAME TRAIN SHOWING CONTRAST OF WHITE TANK CAR
AGAINST SAME BACKGROUND
145
It is, then, an obvious conclusion that the danger potential of a
dark train against a dark background is greatly increased to an older
driver. It is also probable that the visibility of the before, dim
flashers, did not have great impact in the daytime with a background
of bright sky, particularly to drivers of advanced age. A copy of a
letter written by a woman who lived near the crossing, complaining to
the N & W Railroad, was reviewed. She noted that the old signals,
"were the dimmest I have ever seen."
Accident Analysis
The accident record was previously presented in Tables 7 and 8.
The summary shows that in the 15-year period from January 1, 1957
through July 1, 1972, there were 38 accidents, 8 of which were fatal
resulting in 13 deaths. The majority of accidents occurred during
daylight hours in good weather and with dry pavement. Twenty-two of
the 38 involved southbound traffic.
Considering only the train involved accidents, 12 of the 38 (see
Table 8) have occurred since March, 1965. The first three of these
(fatal accidents, all in 1965) involved northbound cars and eastbound
trains. This combination involves restricted sight distance. The
eastbound train is within 200 feet of the highway before it can be
seen by a driver who is about the same distance from the tracks. Why
the drivers ignored or did not see the signals may be difficult to
understand but it is probable that the signals did not have sufficient
impact to warn the drivers adequately of an approaching train.
All nine vehicles involved since 1966 were southbound, where
apparent sight distances and opportunity to see a train from either
direction is excellent. Considering only those that occurred in clear
weather during daylight hours (6 of the 9) the pertinent facts are
summarized in Table 36.
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TABLE 36. SUMMARY OF ACCIDENTS OCCURRING SINCE 1966 DURING DAYLIGHT
AND CLEAR WEATHER
Train Train Vehicle
Date Speed Direction Speed Age Killed Inju
12/24/66 40 EB 60 76 1
12/25/66 40 WB 55 55 1
3/6/70 53 EB 75 47 1
9/5/71 54 EB 60 73 4
10/13/71 50 WB ? 80 1
10/29/71 51 WB 65 71 2
MEAN 48 63 67
Except in the case of the 3/6/70 accident (driver hit train) speeds
were not excessive. The most obvious factor that stands out is "age."
Note that the mean driver age is 67. All three drivers involved in
seven fatalities occurring since 1966 were over 70. This is in accord
with the only significant finding of Sanders' (3) search for a high risk
subgroup, those with demonstrated degradation with age.
Visual acuity deteriorates rapidly with age. The deterioration is
significant past the age of 40. Even though background conditions
during September and October may not have been as severe as they can be
during the mid-summer months with full foliage on the trees, one cannot
ignore the combination of advanced age, dark or dull background, dark
trains, relatively dim signals and driver expectancy. In regard to the
last point there are two adverse possibilities. First, a driver
unfamiliar with the area traveling several miles on a freeway-type
facility might not expect a grade crossing, i.e., he is surprised by
the presence of a train. Secondly, a driver familiar with the general
area has probably crossed this low volume crossing many times without
seeing any sign of a train.
In either case, the newer, brighter signals, the extra signals
over the roadway, the gate arms and the strobe lights on these arms
tend to reduce or eliminate this aspect of the danger. The only other
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visual improvement that could give added insurance
visibility of the
white railcar in Figure 33 is obvious.
The Dilemma Zone
Except for free-flow vehicles almost all of the speed
data were
taken of cars entering the system after the signal
system was activated.
However, there were a few cases when it was apparent
that no car was
going to enter the system soon after the system was
activated that a
vehicle within the system at activation was followed
through the system.
It is emphasized that these data are not to be considered
a representa-
tive sample and conclusive inferences would not be
appropriate; however,
a study of these vehicles emphasizes the unpredictability
of driver
actions at grade crossings. The data are summarized in
Tables 37 and
38.
There was one unusual chance occurrence. With the telephoto
lens,
only one car at a time could be picked up and panned
through the system.
By chance, two cars came into the system together,
one in each lane,
and stayed together through the first five traps such that
it was possi-
ble to follow both. At about the fifth trap an
approaching train
activated the signals. Both vehicles initially slowed, but
one decided
to continue under the descending gates while the other
continued
decelerating to a stop. This contrasting driver strategy can
be seen
in a plot of the two approach profiles shown in Figure 34.
From the vantage point of the writer, the driver that chose
not to
stop appeared to have been close to hitting the descending
gates;
therefore, it could be classified as a bad or reckless decision.
This
situation emphasizes another advantage of automatic gates.
The driver
in this case "got away" with his bad judgment.
It was noted while taking data in the field that cars that
were
in the seventh or eighth trap (within 200 to 300 feet) when the
signals
were activated almost always went through the crossing.
Considering
that a vehicle could travel 264 feet in three seconds even
at the
moderate speed of 60 mph (88 ft/sec) this would be the proper action,
preferrable to trying to stop.
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VEHICLE DID NOT STOP
VEHICLES AT TRAP #5
WHEN SIGNAL ACTIVATED
TRAP LOCATION
FIGURE 34' TWO VEHICLES APPROACHING CROSSING
TOGETHER •' ONE STOPPED, ONE WENT
THROUGH THE GATES COMING DOWN.
151
The gates at this crossing start down concurrent with signal
activation. This is not in accordance with current practice which recom-
mends a three-second delay. However, even without the delay it
appeared to take 6 to 7 seconds for the gates to be down enough to
be in danger of being hit by a car. In this length of time a 60 mph
vehicle could possibly "make it" from 500 to 600 feet. One vehicle,
as can be noted in Table 38, "proved" this point by maintaining a
constant speed of 60 mph from Trap 5 (where the signals were activated)
through the system and "just" making it under the gates.
It was the observer's opinion (or conjecture), based on the fact
that the driver did not speed up in view of the signal activation, that
he expected some delay in gate descent. The recommended three second
delay appears to be warranted and should be in effect at this crossing.
Under the present operating conditions (no delay) the greatest
conflict with the descending gates most likely occurs to a driver who is
in the region of Trap 4 or 5 when the signals are activated, who initi-
ally brakes, and then changes his mind and tries to go on through. If a
driver is going to beat the gates from this distance he had better make
the decision quickly and not slow down while he thinks about it.
It did appear to the observer that many drivers who were no farther
into the system than Trap 6 when the signals were activated tended to
stop. As can be seen by the examples in Table 37, such drivers can stop
without excessively high rates of deceleration. The highest of the
three examples is 17.5 ft/sec/sec which is classified as "very uncom-
fortable" but not considered "emergency."
Evaluation of the Data Collection System
Limitations and Recommendations
Although the data collection system was effective in determining
speed profiles and decelerations, several limitations became apparent
during the study. As the project was initially conceived it was
intended to collect data at night as well as during the day. Attempts
were made with illuminated markers and sensitive film to pick up these
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markers and the headlights of passing vehicles. This proved to be
unacceptable because cars not equipped with front and rear "running
lights" did not show up in the films after passing of the mid-point of
the approach.
One solution to the above problem is suggested. If the camera had
been set-up closer to the track, it can be visualized (refer to Figure
8) that the headlights of all vehicles would have been visible through-
out all of the traps. This location would also have expedited set-up
effort by cutting down the carrying distance of camera equipment
through the fields every time one wished to set up and take data.
A location closer to the tracks could have other advantages. It
would be easier to spot approaching trains. because of looking directly
along the tracks, thus there would be less danger of not being ready
when a train approached. Also, this set-up location might require less
sight distance than that required for the set-up shown in Figure 8,
i.e., less of an "open" quadrant in terms of area. This can be easily
visualized by using Figure 8 and visualizing the camera set up near
the tracks and perhaps closer to the road. Obviously, sight distance
required to use a camera is a drawback because to obtain data on an
approach it is necessary to have clear sight distance for the camera in
at least a large portion of the quadrant of that approach no matter
where the camera is positioned.
For this project markers were essentially put in line along the
highway right-of-way near the fence line because it was convenient to
do so. It is only required that they be put somewhere along the line
of sight between the camera and the end points of the traps. However,
to minimize error it is desirable to place the markers as distant from
the camera as possible.
It is also strongly suggested that, if at all possible, some
shelter from the elements be built. This is essential if it is desired
to collect data during all seasons of the year and/or during all types
of weather conditions. This would not only protect the equipment but
would make conditions more tolerable for an observer in all weather.
The equipment is durable enough but rain on the lens blurs the pictures;
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therefore, it must be protected in inclement weather. An observer must
spend numerous hours physically idle when trains are few and this can
be very uncomfortable in bad and/or cold weather.
One other problem at this particular site was the problem of growing
crops in the fields cutting off the sight distance late in the summer.
It is suggested therefore that the camera position be such that the
camera can be elevated above these crops. This problem at this particu-
lar site was solved by using a step ladder over the point and holding the
camera with a special shoulder harness from the top of the step ladder.
This solution was considered effective, however, a permanently construc-
ted elevated platform probably would have been better and safer - but
more costly.
Figure 35 shows the "normal" camera set-up. It is over the point
that a transit was set when laying out the lines of sight to the
measured trap-limits. The note pad in the figure illustrates the method
used to take and record notes on the film, i.e., appropriate notes were
written and then photographed with the camera.
Figure 36 shows the set up that had to be used after the beans in
the southeast quadrant grew to the point that the targets and vehicles
could not be seen over them. The portable tripod and shoulder harness
are standard equipment used by newsmen, etc. The greatest drawback was
"balancing" on the ladder. After some "learning" experience, it was
possible to keep the camera reasonably steady, but a platform would have
been better.
Since it was necessary on this project to use a 120 mm telephoto
lens and "pan" with the camera to follow a car through the sequence of
traps, the distance from the road could have been increased to 1000 ft.
or more with no additional disadvantage. Taking advantage of this
greater distance may allow a more convenient set up location, e.g., a
field access road may be available. With larger markers, one could
take advantage of even greater camera range. However, one must consider
the possibility that large markers could possibly be too conspicuous
and, therefore, have an effect on driver performance that could bias the
results.
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FIGURE 35. CAMERA SET-UP, READY FOR DATA COLLECTION
UNDER NORMAL CONDITIONS
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FIGURE 36. CAMERA SET-UP USED TO SIGHT OVER BEANS
THAT OBSCURED THE LINE-OF-SIGHT LATE
IN THE SUMMER
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One reason for the selection of the particular camera that was used
was simply that it was a good camera and it was available. However, if
one were to purchase a camera, an 8 mm could possibly be just as
effective and certainly more economical. However, a powerful zoom lens
is a necessity to obtain adequate distance off the roat to permit
accurate analysis of the data.
The following additional suggestions resulted from experiences in
this study:
1. Watch the marker background. It was observed that no
matter how clear the path of sight to the white marker,
when it was against the horizon its image on film was not
sharp, and sometimes difficult to see at all, particularly
when the sun was at a low angle behind the marker.
2. Data reduction was more troublesome on film taken in the
first half of the morning looking east, and the late
afternoon looking west. This relationship to the sun
should be considered when a camera set-up point is chosen.
If it is possible to get a dark background behind the
markers, this problem should not arise unless the sunlight
is directly into the lens.
3. While standing in the field, sighting through the camera
lens, if the markers are partially obscured to the eye,
data reduction from the film will probably be troublesome.
The NW quadrant set-up was in the middle of a cornfield
and near the end of the summer only the tips of some
markers could be seen but they appeared to be very clear
when viewed by eye in the field. However, after the film
was developed and projected, it was extremely troublesome
finding some of them.
4. It is recommended that the data collection procedure be
considered a two-man operation. The procedure requires
that one simultaneously keep track of: a) approaching
trains, b) approaching vehicles, c) focusing and aiming
the camera, d) the start of signal operation, e) picking
up the first vehicle into the system, and f) film speed
while "panning" a vehicle through all the traps. Consider-
ing these five aspects of the procedure concurrently is a
difficult task conducive to periodic error.
5. Where brush has to be cleared for a clear line of sight to
a marker, make sure that more than a minimum amount of
clearing is done, in other words, an area that encompasses
more than just the trap itself. It is recommended that
lines of sight of at least three or four car lengths (or
more) be clear prior to the first marker of the system to
allow for the reaction time necessary to "pick up" a
vehicle through the lens and follow it through the system.
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The system as designed for the project on U. S. 31 near Goldsmith
can be considered a permanent installation, i.e., the trap markers are
firmly imbedded along the edge of the highway right-of-way and can be
used repeatedly year after year. For analysis of data at several grade
crossings a portable system could easily be developed.
Lastly, in addition to being quick, inexpensive and effective for
data collection the camera method has one additiona, inherent advantage.
Before, or while taking data, the observer can photograph the surround-
ings and get a permanent record of the physical features of the area.
This, plus photographed notes, is extremely helpful during the data
reduction and data classification and/or grouping process. The complete
record of the conditions during data collection is right there with the
data. Conditions such as weather are obvious.
The final, general conclusions that can be drawn from the use of
the photographic data technique on this project are:
1. It is effective.
2. It is inexpensive and can be quickly and easily implemented.
3. It provides a superior permanent record.
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CHAPTER 6: ANALYSIS OF FHWA DATA BASE
Introduction
In an attempt to fill the void in knowledge of driver reaction to
grade crossings, FHWA sponsored a research project to record and analyze
driver reaction in the vicinity of grade crossings. The primary antici-
pated use of the data was to have been to determine value of vehicle
delay for the time delay portion of economic models or warrants. The
subsequent final report by Sanders (20) also stated that other valuable
results could be obtained by further analysis of the data, such as
driver reaction during periods of transition from day to night, dry
pavement to wet pavement, etc. Thus, the data were stored by FHWA and
were available on magnetic tape to anyone with an interest.
• As stated by Sanders (20, p. 25-27):
The data collected at each site was generally
divided into several files by the observers who
operated the traffic evaluator. A file mark was
written on the tape whenever any occurrence which
might tend to influence the quality of the data
was noted. Examples include equipment malfunction,
the start of rain or snow, the presence of hitch-
hikers, vehicles stopping for repairs, illumination
transitions at sunrise and sunset, etc.
As might be expected, even though the data collection
period began in clear weather, some adverse condi-
tions were experienced. The data used in this study
was restricted to dry pavement and clear visibility.
A considerable volume of vehicles were recorded
during periods of rain and snow.
The data which was collected under conditions not
comparable among all sites was not analyzed.
Analysis of behavior during specific transition
periods such as from day to night or dry pavement
to snow could produce valuable result, therefore
this data has been retained and is available for
further study.
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The tapes were obtained and included various attachments
explaining
the nature of the data and its orientation on the
tape, including sample
output from the FHWA computer. The material
pertaining to the data is
reproduced in Appendix B; namely, Table Bl) Attachment A,
an index to
site specific information, Table B2) Explanation of
Annotated Listings,
and Table B3) Attachment B, a speed profile key into
which all vehicles
were categorized and coded.
The "index" refers to one of 78 separate files of
reconstructed
vehicles that broke the data down by sites, site directions
and any
"data-influencing" condition. Each of the 26 sites was broken
down by
direction so that there were 52 site directions. In other
words, each
site (1-26) had a minimum of two files, one for each
direction. In
addition, any one of the 52 site directions may have been
further broken
down by occurrences that could affect the data.
This meant that any
given site could have had any number of indices. It can
be noted from
Appendix B, Table B5 that the maximum is six. The summation
of all
indices, two to six, for the 26 sites, added up to the 78
indices or
78 separate tape files listed in Table Bl (Appendix B). The
data were
contained on tapes designated RAILBU containing indexes 1
through 39
and RAILBW containing indexes 40 through 78.
The data base was acquired with two initial goals in
mind. The
first was to compare it with the U. S. 31 data. The second
was to
further analyze the FHWA data for whatever results could
be obtained
to support conclusions of the U. S. 31 data.
Significant Problems
The index numbers were the primary key to assessing a
particular
site, or more specifically, a particular site occurrence.
One of the
first obvious problems with the data set was absence of index
numbers.
Each line of data was for one of five traps. Since there
were
224 characters per line it had to be printed out as two lines
of output.
Thus for every vehicle that passed through the five traps
that comprised
the system, there were ten lines of output. The complete
data set
contained data on 20,198 vehicles which meant 100,990 lines of
data
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(201,980 lines of computer output). The great bulk of data was a
problem.
The Index contained the number of vehicles per file (location
index); but numerous attempts to separate the files properly using
these numbers proved to be unsuccessful. As a last resort, the entire
data set was printed out and studied line by line to find file end-
points primarily by breaks in the time sequences, using the number of
vehicles listed on the index as a guide.
In the manner described above, it was finally determined that on
the first tape, RAILBU, the data at the beginning of the tape did not
correspond to the Index. It was obvious that there was no correlation
between the data on this portion of the tape and the first eleven site
locations as listed on the Index. All the remaining index locations,
12 through 39, as listed in the Index corresponded to breaks in the
data which also related to the listed vehicle counts.
On the second tape, RAILBW, this problem did not exist. However,
it was found that a few of the vehicle counts were wrong which had
been the cause of not being able to find all correct end points of
the various files by line counts.
There was one additional inconvenience with the data. The various
file indices for a particular site were put on tape in apparently no
particular order. For example if one wished to put all the data
together for site 30-28-1, the lane two data index was 21 whereas the
lane one data index was 71 and those were on two different tapes.
Although not impossible, just to "collect" all data for one site even
with the computer was a nuisance.
Other sites were split into as many as six indices such as shown
in Table 39.
The particular site in Table 39 was chosen to illustrate one other
point. Note that the "comments" column could possibly lead to some
valuable information in regard to drivers' reactions to grade crossings,
For example, does the speed profile change from afternoon to early
evening, and how much change occurs during the period of rain. It was
expected that similar transition periods at other locations would
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TABLE 39. ILLUSTRATION OF THE BREAKDOWN OF SITE INDICES
Reference Site Index Lane Time Comments






















provide data to study changes in driver reaction due to changes in
site conditions. However, this site was the only one with such meaning-
ful comments in regard to the reason for the breaks in the data.
Many other site locations have several separate indices indicating
that some change in the weather (or similar significant occurrence) may
have occurred, but there were no comments recorded on the Index, no^
were there anh in the report, to confirm what particular changes had
taken place. Except for differences due to different time periods, and
as noted at the one site, the value of the data in this regard appears
to be severely limited.
Several attempts were made to obtain more information on the way
the data was put on the tapes as well as an attempt to obtain additional
data on the conditions which were relevant to the division into location
indices at various sites. This was done through FHWA personnel who
wanted to be helpful, but no additional information could be found.
Revised, Sampled Data Set
Although it was apparent that the data set would probably not
yield any great amount of information or reliable results, it was
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decided to continue some analysis for possible meaningful comparisons
with the U. S. 31 results.
After determining how to locate the end points of each of the 78
location indices, a program was written to reduce the data to a more
manageable set.
The original data set was reduced to about 18,000 lines, each
containing the speed of a vehicle at the five traps. There were,
however, large variations in the numbers of vehicles recorded at each
site. For example, at site 100-VD-l from 0900 to 1500, data were taken
on 2490 vehicles on the East side approach but on the West side approach,
during the same time period, only 175 vehicles were recorded. Other
index locations varied in quantity of data from 1 vehicle to 1266.
Since there was no indication that this variation in numbers was planned
or had anything to do with expected variance of the data, it was decided
to sample the larger subsets to further reduce the data.
The SPSS package available on the Purdue computer system contains
sampling program. A SAMPLE command provides a means for taking a random
sample of any size from any data set or file for further processing.
The sampled set can also be saved.
All vehicles other than cars that did not stop were separated and
set aside for possible additional analysis. Also, all vehicles that
approached while the signals were activated or with a train approaching
were also stored as a separate data file. Location indices of the
remaining portion of the data were sampled. If the number of vehicles
in any particular location index was greater than 100 cars, a sample
of about 100 cars was obtained. If the number of vehicles was less
than 100, all of them were included. This reordered, sampled set
further reduced the data to a more manageable level.
One other set of parameters had to be added to the data set. In
order that deceleration rates could be calculated, distances between
points where each of the five speeds were recorded had to be known.
These distances were not constant as was the case at the Indiana, U. S.
31 site. It appeared that the tape switches were put down at approxi-
mate distances, perhaps where convenient, and then measured. The first
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three traps were placed on each approach and two additional traps were
beyond the crossing.
The distances from the first "trap" to the track varied from 1376
feet to 376 feet, with most being between 1000 feet and 500 feet. The
second "trap" locations were mostly between 200 feet and 100 feet of the
crossing. The "trap" closest to the tracks was all on the order of
feet to 15 feet from the crossing.
Unusable Locations
The first 11 location indices were not available from the data set.
Obviously, this affected any sight whose data set included on of these
files. There were six locations affected partially or totally (Table
B5 in Appendix B). It can also be noted in this table that four of the
location indices (59, 44, 65, 57) had data on a total of six or less
vehicles, from which it is obvious that no meaningful results could be
obtained.
Three other sites only reported speed profiles on one approach,
sites 2-42, 30-28-1 and 100-VD-l (ref. 20, p. A-7, A-71 and A-9).
Speed profile of the "other" approach was labeled "NOT AVAILABLE" in
each case. Also, not available for these approaches were distances to
the speed location points.
Site-Specific Information
Geometry . The only data obtainable in regard to site geometry was
from sketches in Sander's report (ref. 20, Appendix A).
Roughness . A subjective roughness measure was determined for each
location to account for some of the difference in speed variation
between crossings. The hypothesis was (20, p. 29):
... the reduction in speed from the desired speed
measured at a large distance before the crossing to
the speed at the crossing would be the greatest for
the most rough crossings, and lowest for the most
smooth.
It was determined that this hypothesis was true. This can be seen





















-I 1 1 I r-12 3 4 5
CROSSING ROUGHNESS
FIGURE 37= MEAN PERCENT SPEED REDUCTION FROM
DESIRED SPEED TO CROSSING SPEED BY
ROUGHNESS CATEGORY. (SOURCE- REF. 20, R 30)
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between crossings of equal roughness or the roughness had to be con-
sidered as a variable.
Data Analysis
Much of the data were for cars that did not stop. In the termi-
nology of the analysis of Indiana U. S. 31 data, most of these would
be analogous to free-flow vehicles.
One sub-set of data was all vehicles that were in the system with
either a train present and/or signals operating. The fifth column of
the revised data set contained the vehicle type code. The key is pre-
sented in Table 40.
TABLE 40. SPEED PROFILE KEY
Type Explanation
1 Passenger car which did not stop
2 2-axle truck which did not stop
3 Bus which did not stop
5
1 Truck combine which did not stop and not
required to stop
6 Passenger car which stopped
7 2-axle truck which stopped
8 Bus which stopped
9 Truck combine which stopped and required
to stop
10 Truck combine which stopped and not
required to stop
Note:
1. No type "4" defined or used
2. Explanations from reference 20
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The data set consisted primarily of type 1 vehicles, approximately
16,000. All vehicles other than type 1 were separated into their own
data set of 1708 vehicles.
An obvious objective was to acquire information on the nine
approach profiles (Table 40) in regard to their similarities and
di fferences
.
It was also felt that pairwise comparisons, such as, buses that
did not stop vs. buses that stopped, trucks and/or truck combines that
did not stop vs. trucks and/or truck combines that did stop, could give
valuable insight into the point on the approach that the decision or
action to stop started. For those drivers of vehicles required to stop
at grade crossings, the point of beginning deceleration could be an
indicator of the impact of a particular warning system or geometry or
combination of both. For example, truck drivers, knowing that they are
going to stop at a grade crossing, should begin this maneuver at some
"average," safe distance from the crossing. At any given crossing where
the action was started significantly closer to the crossing than the
average, it might be concluded that the warning system was not having
the desired impact on the driver. This would be particularly true if
all drivers were not familiar with the area and did not know when a
grade crossing was ahead.
The data set was broken down by type. For each type the average
speed of each of the five traps was calculated. This "mean" profile
for each category was plotted. The results are shown in Figure 38.
It was found that there was a complete absence of type 9, "truck
combine which stopped and required to stop." Also, type 10, "truck
combine which stopped and not required to stop," contained only two
entries. Sanders (20, p. 32) reported obtaining data on 339 buses of
which 202 stopped. The data set obtained from FHWA contained 190 buses
of which 33 stopped.
From the diagram, Figure 38, it can be seen that some of the
categories that reportedly stopped, type 6 through type 10 (dotted
lines), were going faster at the crossing than those that did not




















Type I x Passenger car which did not stop, n = l5,864
Type 2 2 axle truck which did not stop, n« 358
Type 3 O Bus which did not stop, n=l57
TypeS A Truck combine which did not stop and
not required to stop, n= 174
Type 6 * Passenger car which stopped , n= 1000
Type 7 2 axle truck which stopped, n= 5
Type 8 O Bus which stopped, n= 33
TypelO A Truck combine which stopped ^^
"A and not required to stop,
n = 2 jzf '
20
10 t i r- 112 3 4
LOCATION BY STATION NUMBER (NO SCALE)
FIGURE 38 SPEED PROFILES OF ALL CLASSES OF
VEHICLES CONTAINED IN THE FHWA DATA
BASE.
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complete set until the author was convinced that these mean speeds shown
in the figure represent the data and are not the result of errors in the
computer program.
In addition, the mean speeds of type 1 vehicles were replotted in
Figure 39 to approximately the same scale as those in Sanders' (20)
report (refer to Figures 3 and 4 in Chapter 2). The plot of these mean
speeds, both in miles per hour and as a percentage of entering speeds,
show that the results are generally consistent with the plots in
Sanders' (20) report. This implies the same data base, although the
latter had more restrictions on the data set which comprised the means
of the plot, specifically the following three:
1. Data were taken only from grade crossings with roughness
index <2.5
2. Data were taken only from grade crossings on two lane
roads, and
3. The data were a different sample of the total set at
each location.
From the above analysis of the data set, there is no reason to
doubt the validity of the data for type 1 vehicles (passenger cars)
that did not stop. It appears, however, that the data for the other
types of vehicles, especially those that stopped, as recorded on the
available tapes, are unrelaible. Note that three of the four mean
speeds from supposedly " stopped " categories are greater than 20 mph,
and that two of them are greater than the type 1 group classified as
passenger cars which did not stop. It should be noted that Sanders
(20) primarily utilized the type 1 vehicles which did not stop for his
report and there is, therefore, no contention with his results.
It was decided that further analysis of the data would not be
beneficial. No matter what significant results were apparent by any
analytical means at or between any of the grade crossings or groups,
there was no assurance as to what the results were due to. Besides,
whatever discrepancies there may have been in the data, there was no
first hand knowledge of site-conditions.
The data for cars that did not stop appeared to be valid. Attempts



































































































































at the U. S. 31 crossing there were eight traps on the approaches at
fixed distances. The crossings of the FHWA data had only three, at
varying distances.
One attempt was made to "convert" the FHWA data to comparable
speeds by assuming constant deceleration between points and interpolating
and/or extrapolating to calculate eight equivalent speeds on each
approach. The calculated results were such that the values appeared
to be unreliable, e.g., extrapolations to speeds in excess of 100 mph
in some cases or negative speeds in other cases. In addition, there
was no way to rate the roughness factor at the Goldsmith grade crossing
such that it would be consistent with the subjective ratings of the
crossings of the FHWA sponsored study.
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CHAPTER 7: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Summary
This summary is directed toward tying the report together but is
limited to specific points directly associated with the conclusions
that follow.
There is a definite need for reporting and coordinating all trans-
portation related accidents. This is particularly true at highway-
railway grade crossings. The FHWA Office of Research is attempting to
validate accident prediction models for urban/rural, active/passive
categories. However, there are only a relatively few states who have
suitable data. The national grade crossing inventory is a step forward
in this regard.
There are major weaknesses with predictive models based on accident
experience—in addition to the faults inherent in the data base.
Research indicates that current regression equations explain only a
small percentage of the accident experience. Typically such equations
include volumes and physical characteristics of the crossing and do not
include characteristics of the driver. Predictive equations have
limited usefulness and it is reasonable to hypothesize that a certain
level of accident experience is a confounding of driver error and
chance which defies quantitative analysis.
An extension of accident prediction equations is the attempt to
include some sort of economic analysis; i.e., make improved protection
cost-effective. One can conclude from the literature that there are
many concepts but no real concensus in regard to what constitutes a
completely valid and/or proper economic analysis. The factors which
are included range from aggregated driver and vehicle delay costs to
placing a cost on lives. Both are debatable from the standpoint of
what values should be used. Most past economic studies appear similar
to the benefit-cost studies given heavy usage in past years to justify
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public works improvements. In the case of grade crossings the effective-
ness portion of the cost-effectiveness approach is difficult to evaluate
because there is no proven way to measure it short of long-term accident
experience.
It is now generally accepted that flashing lights and gates reduce
materially the number of accidents that occur at railroad crossings.
This is particularly true of automatic gates which are generally accepted
as being superior to flashing lights alone. However, there is not total
agreement of objective criteria on which to base a set of warrants which
would optimize their use, make them "cost-effective" or at least insure
that they are used in locations where they will do the most good relative
to meaningful priority ratings.
Drivers desire improved communication in dangerous situations;
particularly at grade crossings which they consider to be very dangerous.
They need some active warning with a high degree of reliability. When
drivers are alerted unnecessarily they tend to disregard the warning.
Rural, high-speed locations of relatively isolated grade crossings need
warning of train approach with greater impact on the driver.
Driver Reaction at a High-Speed Rural Grade Crossing
This research concerned driver reaction to two different signal
systems at a high-speed, high-accident, rural grade crossing. Essen-
tially it is a before and after analysis, as the protection was
upgraded from old, standard flashers to a modern automatic gate instal-
lation activated by a Marquardt speed predictor, as well as an
evaluation of possible measures of crossing warning effectiveness.
An Interim Report (29) reported an independent analysis of the before
data. The after data were subsequently analyzed with the raw before
data for the final analysis presented herein.
One objective of the research was to evaluate parameters that
measure effectiveness, such as, approach speed and deceleration rate.
Speeds at eight traps on each approach and deceleration rates between
each trap were calculated. For several categories of before and after
vehicles numerous comparisons were made.
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The information was analyzed in the context of the physical condi-
tions of the site and their relation to the human factors literature.
Particular attention was given to conditions affecting visual acuity •
and train conspicuity.
Finally, some atypical data relating to variability of driver
reaction when near the crossing and confronted with gate activation and
the immediate decision of stopping or not stopping were analyzed.
Data Collection System
The Goldsmith study was undertaken quickly on a very limited
budget. An inexpensive, easily implemented data collection system was
developed. The data collection system was studied during the course of
the project to evaluate its shortcomings as well as recommend procedures
to enhance the operation. Basically, markers were placed along the line
of sight of a 16 mm variable speed camera and 55-foot speed traps were
marked along the centerline of the highway. By running the camera at a
constant speed, a vehicle was photographed from one marker to the next
and the vehicle's speed was calculated from the frame count after the
film was developed.
FHWA Data Base
FHWA sponsored a project to record and analyze driver reaction in
the vicinity of crossings. A resulting data base was developed by
the contractor. Originally, the data were used for determining the
value of vehicle delay for the time-delay portion of economic models
and warrants.
A large portion of the data was not analyzed and was available for
further analysis (20). It was anticipated that an analysis of these
data would supplement the analysis of the Goldsmith data.
Conclusions
The following are the conclusions of this study:
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General
1. To compare parameters associated with driver reaction and
changes in reaction due to improvements or changing conditions at
actively protected grade crossings, the categories, "free-flow,"
"first-unobstructed," "first obstructed," and "following" proved to
be adequate and should be given consideration as standard terminology.
2. The analysis of the Goldsmith crossing data, including mean
speeds, mean deceleration rates, mean speeds of above-pace drivers,
individual speeds of fastest drivers and highest deceleration rates
showed that no driver in the before and after samples approached in
a manner that resulted in an accident or a near miss implying:
a. Grade crossing accidents involve singularly
inattentative drivers.
b. Mean values of speed and deceleration are weak
parameters for evaluating hazard at a grade crossing or
the effectiveness of grade crossing warning improvements,
because almost all drivers approach a crossing in a safe
manner.
c. There is a need for constant monitoring or long
term sampling to "catch" the occasional erratic drivers
and evaluate the characteristics of such drivers.
3. Examination of the individual fastest drivers showed an absence
of any definable approach trends before and after.
4. Mean approach speeds, although a weak parameter for conclusions
regarding warning effectiveness did provide information on driver
approach characteristics:
a. They approached slower when the amount of stimuli
present was greater, such as a train across the track
or a gate down.
5. All free-flow plots and several statistical tests showed a
consistent lowering of mean approach speeds 1100 feet from the crossing
after improvement, implying that drivers were aware of the crossing
after improvement farther from the crossing, due to the visibility of
the gate arms in the raised position.
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6. Although the Goldsmith grade crossing is in a rural area,
the two approaches are different in character; namely, the north
approach was truly "rural" while the south approach might best fit
a "suburban" description because of development on the approach.
a. On the "suburban" approach, northbound traffic
did not take further decelerating action, relative to entry
speed (at 1100 feet), until around 500 feet from the
crossing even when alerted earlier, supporting other
research (Sanders, 20).
b. On the "rural" approach, southbound drivers began
to decelerate further, relative to entry speed, at about
700 feet from the crossing implying that on this high-speed
rural approach drivers reacted earlier than "suburban"
drivers when alerted earlier.
7. Analysis of >72 mph vehicles within the approach distance
(1100 feet), before and after, showed that there was the same
percentage of northbound drivers >72 mph but the percentage of south-
bound drivers >72 mph decreased from 23.6% before to 13.6% after.
Driver Reaction to Activated Signals
1. The plots of the "first obstructed - after" (by gates) were
comparable to the "first obstructed - before" (by train), and in the
case of southbound vehicles there was no statistical difference between
values at any trap. Thus the gates with strobe lights had the same
effect as a train across the road on slowing the average motorist.
2. The approach speeds of following vehicles were more affected
by other vehicles than by the signal, before and after, and their
approach speed profiles were independent of signal type.
3. Studying individual fastest cars entering the system just
after signal activation showed that there was a substantial decrease
in the percentages of speeds greater than 65 mph than when the signals
were not activated, particularly on the southbound approach. The
implication is that the signals, both before and after, had some
impact at distances greater than Trap #1 (1162 feet).
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5. From personal observation and comments from "visitors" to the
site, the most alerting aspect of the new signal system is the strobe
lights on the gate arms. The use of strobe lights on gate arms merits
further study to measure driver reaction to varying degrees of bright-
ness, flash rate, and distance of impact--both day and night.
6. There were no deceleration rates at the Goldsmith grade cross-
ing that classified as emergency before or after upgrading the protec-
tion. There was a reduction in the decelerations above undesirable
classifications for the after system but the numbers before as well as
after were too few to permit statistical comparison.
Visual Acuity
1. At the Goldsmith grade crossing, dark trains against a dark
background on both rail approaches, and particularly to the west,
presented a subtle but dangerous sight visibility problem to the
southbound driver. A bright sky before the driver on the road
approached further reduced the capability of his eyes to adjust to
either a dark train or the dim flashing crossing signal at the side
of the road. In one previous study, a high risk subgroup of drivers
involved in grade crossing accidents was found to be those of old age
with associated degradation of visual acuity (3). The Goldsmith
accident record also shows that the average age of the drivers
involved in the fatal and injury accidents since 1966 was 67 and that
all drivers involved in the three fatal accidents with seven deaths
in 1971 were all over 70 years of age. The most likely primary cause
of these high-accident record years was train and/or signal conspicuity
inadequate to compensate for the advanced age of the drivers and the
conditions described.
The Data Collection System
1. The 16 mm camera system used at the Goldsmith crossing was
effective, inexpensive and quick to implement and also provided an
excellent record of the conditions during data collection.
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FHWA Data Base
1. The data obtained from FHWA, although adequate for its
primary purpose of vehicle delay modeling, proved to be of little
value in this study.
Overall Comparison
1. Although an exact value of added effectiveness of the after
system (gates plus larger flashers plus strobe lights plus Marquardt
predictor) could not be determined when compared to the before system,
the approach speed profiles of drivers approaching this crossing
indicate that they are being alerted earlier and more effectively with
the after system. This type of installation should be strongly
considered for other high hazard crossing locations when upgrading of
present protection is planned.
Closure
The Southern Pacific Transportation Company is widely known
for their use of automatic gates at railroad grade crossings. For
several years they have averaged installing 200 per year or 39% of
the average of 519 total installed for the United States. Their
philosophy is that "where" and "under what conditions" they should be
used cannot be modeled mathematically. They know they are effective
and believe they are worth the cost and install them wherever (includ-
ing some branch lines as well as main line tracks) they feel that they
are proper. 1 There have been long range studies (1942-1966) on their
installations which prove that they are effective and that they save
lives.
The Transportation Research Board (TRB) Committee on Highway-
Railroad Grade Crossings has recently compiled a list of research
priorities in regard to grade crossings. Number one on the list is
"Driver Reaction to Active Warning Systems." This includes suggested
areas such as 1) the visibility and attention attracting properties
of warning devices, 2) minimum conspicuity levels of signals and trains,
Private communication, H. M. Williamson, Chief Engineer
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3) driver reaction to innovative signals such as highway traffic signals
and variable message signs, 4) variation in warning time that drivers
will accept, 5) gate arm conspicuity and activation times and 6) study
of system cost. In short, several problems that this study has
addressed are still research items of high priority and will continue
to be until several controlled field studies have been completed.
There is a need for continued research to seek and find answers,
to quantify, to model, to find measures of effectiveness, to under-
stand driver behavior, etc. This is the role of research and must
continue. On the other hand, there is a need to continue improving
grade crossing safety, to save lives, to use whatever methods or systems
are known to accomplish this end regardless of any unanswered questions
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TABLE Bl. ATTACHMENT A REFERRED TO IN
EXPLANATION OF ANNOTATED LISTINGS
Tape=RAILBU Disk
File No.
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Lane 1 Cedarville 7462 40 45 7507 36
36 Site 10-52
RT. 194/ New Midway MD
3/8/72 12.10-13.24
Location 1
Lane 2 RT 194
New Midway RD 7507 68 73 7580 37
37 Site 10-52
RT 194, New Midway MD
3/8/72 14.36-18.30
Location 2
Lane 1 RT 194
New Midway RD 7580 240 245 7825 38
38 Site 10-52
RT 194, New Midway MD
3/8/72 14.36-18.30
Location 2
Lane 2 RT 194
New Midway MD 7825 144 149 7974 39
39 Site 10-5
RT28, Point of Rocks, MD
Eval 1
3/7/72 8.00AM-3.00PM
Lane 2 RT2 8








Lane 2 MD 550








Lane 1 VA-15 8609 218 223 8832 43
43 Site Berekeley Co. W. VA.
3/11/72
10.07 to 16.20


















Lane 2 VA-PW28 9247 783 788 10035 48
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Lane 1 VA-652 11134 147 152 11286 53




Jeff Duffields 11286 19 24 11310 54




Jeff Duffields 11310 37 42 11352 55




Jeff Duffields 11352 15 20 11372 56
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TABLE Bl. (continued)
56 Site Jeff Duffields W.VA.
3/11/72
12.20 to 13.30
Jeff Duffields 11372 20 25 11397 57
57 Site Jeff Duffields W.VA.
3/11/72
13.30 to 16.30
L tin c 2
Jeff Duffields 11397 6 11 11408 58














Lane 1 2-42 11476 245 250 11726 61
61 Site VA 234
3/12/72
15.55 to 20.00
Lane 3 $ 4 VA-234 11726 1103 1108 12834 62
62 Site VA 234
3/12/72
15.55 to 20.00 *
^ nnn





Lane 1 § 2 15-X 12878 346 351 13229 64
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TABLE Bl. (continued)
64 Van Dorn Ave
West Side
9.00 - 3.00































Lane 1 § 2
Central Ave South 13669
175 180 13409 65
11 13420 66
13 18 13438 67
137 142 13580 68
84 89 13669 69




Lane 1 § 2





Lane 1 VA-F-28 14223 246 251 14474 72
206
TABLE Bl . (continued)
7 2 Van Dorn Ave
East Side Eval 1
3/1/72
9.00 - 3.00
Lane 1 £j 2





















Lane 1 Randolph 19039 1199 1204 20243
77 Site Berkeley Co. W.VA.
3/11/72
10.07 to 16.20





Lane 2 Redland RD 20312 358 363 20675 79
78
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TABLE B2. EXPLANATION OF ANNOTATED LISTINGS
1. Data for each vehicle is in sets of five records, i.e.,
data recorded at each trap. One record is two lines of
print as shown on the sample. Each logical record is 224
characters. Block size is /3"3 6 . Density is 800.
2 The Index shows the site specific information and
number of vehicles observed. Other data relevant to each
site are attached. (Attachment A)
3. The printed format for each record is as follows:
LINE 1 :
a. Vehicle type (1 -10)




f. Time of day Hr. Min. Sec.
xx yy zz
g. Front axle time (milliseconds)
(multiply x 10 7 )
h. Rear axle time (milliseconds)
i. Front axle speed (mph)
j . Rear axl e speed (mph)
k. Average axle speed (mph) (whole number part)
1. Number of characters per logical record
LINE 2:
m. Average axle speed (mph) (decimal part)













Two and three axle bus - 15 feet
plus vehicles coded as bus
208
TABLE B2. (continued)
*o . Time gap between leading vehicle and this vehicle(sec)
*p. Space gap between leading vehicle and this vehicle(ft)
*q. Space gap between this vehicle and following vehicle(ft)
*r.. Time gap between this vehicle and following vehicle(sec)
* Overhangs of bumpers have been taken into account
in measures of all gaps.
209
TABLE B3. ATTACHMENT "B" REFERRED TO IN
EXPLANATION OF ANNOTATED LISTINGS
Type 1 Passenger car which did not stop
Type 2 2-axle truck which did not stop
Type 3 Bus which did not stop
Type 5 Truck combine which did not stop and
not required to stop
Type 6 Passenger car which stopped
Type 7 2-axle truck which stopped
Type 8 Bus which stopped
Type 9 Truck combine which stopped and
required to stop
Type 10 Truck combine which stopped and
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Eugene Robert Russell was born August 24, 1932, in Cromwell,
Connecticut. He received his primary education in Cromwell and second-
ary education in Middletown, Connecticut, where he was graduated from
Middletown High School in 1950.
He attended Hartford Institute of Technology for one year prior to
being called to active duty with the U. S. Naval Reserve in 1951. After
being discharged he resumed his education at Missouri School of Mines
and Metallurgy (now University of Missouri - Rolla) where he received
the Bachelor of Science Degree in Civil Engineering in 1958.
He worked until August 1962 in the Bridge Department of the Cali-
fornia Division of Highways at which time he took a position with the
Iowa Highway Commission as a Resident Construction Engineer.
In September 1963 he entered Iowa State University and received
the Master of Science degree in August 1965. He joined the faculty of
Indiana Institute of Technology, Fort Wayne, as an Assistant Professor
in September 1965 and taught courses in all areas of Civil Engineering.
In June 1969 he came to Purdue University as a Graduate Instructor to
work toward the Ph.D. degree.
He is a Member of the American Society of Civil Engineers, a Member
of the American Association of Engineering Education, an Associate
Member of the Institute of Traffic Engineers, An Associate Member of
Sigma Xi , and an affiliate of the National Association of County
Engineers.
He is married and has 10 children.
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